Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
Groupe d'action financière sur le blanchiment de capitaux

Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40 Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations

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(Updated as of February 2007)
METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING COMPLIANCE WITH THE FATF 40
RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE FATF 9 SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS

ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING/COMBATING TERRORIST FINANCING
METHODOLOGY 2004 (UPDATED AS OF FEBRUARY 2007)

Introduction

This document consists of three sections. Following this introduction, the first section consists of
an overview of the assessment methodology, its background, how it will be used in
evaluations/assessments, and a description of what is necessary for an effective anti-money laundering
and combating the financing of terrorism (“AML/CFT”) system. The second section contains guidance
and interpretation concerning the Methodology, including on the essential criteria, the additional elements
and on compliance. The third section sets out the essential criteria and the additional elements for each of
the FATF Recommendations. Finally, there is annex to the Methodology that sets out definitions or
meanings for many of the words or phrases that are used in the document.

The AML/CFT Assessment Methodology

Background to Methodology

1. The Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Terrorist Financing (AML/CFT) Methodology 2004,
including the assessment criteria, is designed to guide the assessment of a country’s compliance with the
international AML/CFT standards as contained in the FATF Forty Recommendations 2003 (updated as of
October 2004) and the FATF Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing 2001 (updated as of
February 2006) (referred to jointly as the FATF Recommendations). The criteria within this Methodology
do not expand upon or modify the Forty Recommendations and Nine Recommendations which constitute
the international standard. The Methodology is a key tool to assist assessors when they are preparing
AML/CFT detailed assessment reports/mutual evaluation reports. It will assist them in identifying the
systems and mechanisms developed by countries with diverse legal, regulatory and financial frameworks,
in order to implement robust AML/CFT systems. The Methodology is also useful for countries that are
reviewing their own systems, including in relation to technical assistance projects.

2. It reflects the principles set out in the FATF Recommendations. It is also informed by the
experience of the FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) from their mutual evaluations, of
the International Monetary Fund (the Fund) and the World Bank (the Bank) in the Financial Sector
Assessment Program and by the Fund from the Offshore Financial Center assessment program. The
FATF, the Fund and the Bank have also reviewed the assessments/mutual evaluations conducted in 2002
and 2003 using the AML/CFT Methodology issued in October 2002, and these reviews have also
provided guidance in developing this Methodology.

Evaluations/assessments using the Methodology

3. The Methodology follows the structure of the FATF Recommendations. However, as the
Methodology is a tool to assist assessors in determining whether countries are in compliance with the
FATF Recommendations, it is not intended that detailed assessment reports/mutual evaluation reports will
rigidly follow the format and structure of the Methodology. Rather the format for these reports will be
based on the four fundamental areas noted in paragraph 6 below.
4. The assessments will also need to be based on and refer to relevant underlying information, such as the quantum and type of predicate offences for money laundering; the vulnerability of the country to money laundering or terrorist financing; the methods, techniques and trends used to launder money or fund terrorists; the structure of the financial system and the nature of the sectors dealing with designated non-financial businesses and professions; the nature of the underlying criminal justice system, as well as any changes that have been made to the AML/CFT system in the relevant period. Most importantly, the reports will allow for an assessment of whether the Recommendations have been fully and properly implemented and the AML/CFT system is effective. As in previous FATF evaluation rounds, this could be judged by reference to quantitative data and the results that have been achieved, or could be based upon more qualitative factors.

5. It should be noted that in some countries, AML/CFT issues are matters that are addressed not just at the level of the national government, but also at state/province or local levels. For example, profit generating criminal offences may exist at both federal and state levels. Measures to combat money laundering should be taken at the appropriate level of government, necessary to ensure that the full range of AML/CFT measures applies. When evaluations or assessments are being conducted, appropriate steps should be taken to ensure that AML/CFT measures at the state/provincial level are also adequately addressed.

**Structure necessary for an effective AML/CFT system**

6. An effective AML/CFT system requires an adequate legal and institutional framework, which should include: (i) laws that create money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (FT) offences and provide for the freezing, seizing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and terrorist funding; (ii) laws, regulations or in certain circumstances other enforceable means that impose the required obligations on financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions; (iii) an appropriate institutional or administrative framework, and laws that provide competent authorities with the necessary duties, powers and sanctions; and (iv) laws and other measures that give a country the ability to provide the widest range of international co-operation. It is also essential that the competent authorities ensure that the whole system is effectively implemented. The assessment of individual recommendations, as well as any findings relevant to paragraph 7 below, may lead to broader conclusions on the global effectiveness of a country’s AML/CFT system. These conclusions should be mentioned in both the mutual evaluation report/detailed assessment report and in the executive summary as part of the report’s overall findings on the AML/CFT system in the country and the effectiveness of that system (see also the MER template in the Handbook for Countries and Assessors).

7. An effective AML/CFT system also requires that certain structural elements, not covered by the AML/CFT assessment criteria, be in place. The lack of such elements, or significant weaknesses or shortcomings in the general framework, may significantly impair the implementation of an effective AML/CFT framework. Although the AML/CFT assessment criteria do not cover these conditions, assessors should consider whether there are apparent major weaknesses or shortcomings and should note these in the mutual evaluation/detailed assessment report. These elements should include in particular:

   a) the respect of principles such as transparency and good governance;
   b) a proper culture of AML/CFT compliance shared and reinforced by government, financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses and professions; industry trade groups, and self-regulatory organisations (SROs);
   c) appropriate measures to prevent and combat corruption, including, where information is available, laws and other relevant measures, the jurisdiction’s participation in regional or international anti-corruption initiatives (such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption)\(^1\) and the impact of these measures on the jurisdiction’s AML/CFT implementation;

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\(^1\) Other initiatives include the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, the Group of States against Corruption (Groupe d’Etats contre la corruption—GRECO), the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia/Pacific, the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.
d) a reasonably efficient court system that ensures that judicial decisions are properly enforced;

e) high ethical and professional requirements for police officers, prosecutors, judges, etc. and measures and mechanisms to ensure these are observed;

f) a system for ensuring the ethical and professional behaviour on the part of professionals such as accountants and auditors, and lawyers. This may include the existence of codes of conduct and good practices, as well as methods to ensure compliance such as registration, licensing, and supervision or oversight.

Guidance on the Essential Criteria, the Additional Elements, and the Compliance Ratings, and General Interpretation concerning the AML/CFT Standards and Methodology

8. The assessment of the adequacy of a country’s AML/CFT framework will not be an exact process, and the vulnerabilities and risks that each country has in relation to ML and FT will be different depending on domestic and international circumstances. ML and FT techniques evolve over time, and therefore AML/CFT policies and best practices will also need to develop and adapt to counter the new threats.

9. The FATF Recommendations provide the international standard for combating money laundering and terrorist financing and the Recommendations and the criteria set out in this Methodology are applicable to all countries. However, assessors should be aware that the legislative, institutional and supervisory framework for AML/CFT may differ from one country to the next. Provided the FATF Recommendations are complied with, it is acceptable that countries implement the international standards in a manner consistent with their national legislative and institutional systems, even though the methods by which compliance is achieved may differ. In this regard, assessors should be aware of each country’s stage of economic development, its range of administrative capacities, and different cultural and legal conditions. Moreover, the report should provide the context for the assessment, and make note of any progress that has been or is being made in implementing the international standards and the criteria in this Methodology.

Essential Criteria

10. The essential criteria are those elements that should be present in order to demonstrate full compliance with the mandatory elements of each of the Recommendations. Criteria to be assessed are numbered sequentially for each Recommendation, but the sequence of criteria is not important. In some cases elaboration (indented below the criteria) is provided in order to assist in identifying important aspects of the assessment of the criteria. In addition, examples are provided, for some criteria, of situations in which a particular requirement could apply, or where there may be exceptions to the normally applicable obligations. The examples are not part of the criteria, and are only illustrative, but they may provide guidance as to whether national measures for particular criteria may be appropriate.

Compliance Ratings

11. For each Recommendation there are four possible levels of compliance: compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, and non-compliant. In exceptional circumstances a Recommendation may also be rated as not applicable. These ratings are based only on the essential criteria, and defined as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Compliance Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Compliant</td>
<td>The Recommendation is fully observed with respect to all essential criteria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largely compliant</td>
<td>There are only minor shortcomings, with a large majority of the essential criteria being fully met.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially compliant</td>
<td>The country has taken some substantive action and complies with some of the essential criteria.</td>
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12. Assessors should review whether the laws and regulations meet the appropriate standard and whether there is adequate capacity and implementation of those laws. Countries should only be regarded as fully complying with criteria if the relevant laws, regulations or other AML/CFT measures are in force and effect at the time of the on-site visit to the country or in the period immediately following the on-site mission, and before the finalisation of the report.

13. Laws that impose preventive AML/CFT requirements upon the banking, insurance, and securities sectors should be implemented and enforced through the supervisory process. In these sectors, the core supervisory principles issued by the Basel Committee, IAIS, and IOSCO should also be adhered to. For certain issues, these supervisory principles will overlap with or be complementary to the requirements set out in this Methodology. Assessors should be aware of, and have regard to any assessments or findings made with respect the Core Principles, or to other principles or standards issued by the supervisory standard-setting bodies. For other types of financial institutions, it will vary from country to country as to whether these laws and obligations are implemented and enforced through a regulatory or supervisory framework, or by other means.

**Additional Elements**

14. The additional elements are options that can further strengthen the AML/CFT system and may be desirable. They are derived from non-mandatory elements in the FATF Recommendations or from Best Practice and other guidance issued by the FATF, or by international standard-setters such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Although they form part of the overall assessment, they are not mandatory, and are not assessed for compliance purposes. To make this absolutely clear, the additional elements are formulated as questions. Assessors may consider and comment on the measures that have been taken or not taken, having regard to the particular circumstances of that country. In a similar way, assessors also have discretion to note other matters which they identify as strengthening or which might strengthen the AML/CFT system.

**Effective Implementation**

15. It is essential that all the FATF Recommendations are effectively implemented, and that assessments or evaluations address this issue and reflect it in the rating. The fundamental point, as noted in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, is that reports will not only assess formal compliance with the FATF Recommendations, but will also assess compliance having regard to whether the Recommendations have been implemented effectively. Assessors should regard effectiveness as an essential component in assessing each Recommendation. Effectiveness could have a positive, neutral, or negative influence on the overall rating for each Recommendation. The assessors’ findings should be fully set out in the report. Assessors should note that the onus is on the assessed country to demonstrate (whether through statistics or by other factors) that implementation of the Recommendations is effective.

16. When assessing whether particular Recommendations have been effectively implemented, assessors will need to take into account quantitative data and qualitative and other information. As noted in paragraph 9 above, it must be recognised that every country has different AML/CFT laws and systems and that each evaluation will always need to be assessed on its own merits. Judging effectiveness will also require assessors to be aware of the particular circumstances of an assessed country, including the ML and FT vulnerabilities and risks, the legal and institutional AML/CFT framework and the structural elements referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 above. Consideration should also always be given to certain fundamental factors such as the population of the country, the size of its financial and DNFBP sectors, the amount and type of predicate crime and money laundering activity, and of vulnerability to terrorist financing etc.
Absolute data is not usually determinative by itself, and should normally be considered relative to these other factors.

17. In addition to obtaining information on direct results and on the underlying context, assessors should also consider a range of other sources that may provide other relevant information on effectiveness such as reports by other bodies focused on similar or related issues including:

- country reports made under UNSCR 1373;
- FSAP or OFC reports issued by the IMF or World Bank;
- reports on anti-bribery measures prepared by bodies such as the OECD or the GRECO committee of the Council of Europe;
- national studies on AML/CFT measures.

18. Another important element of the process for discussing and checking effectiveness is the on-site visit to the assessed country. The assessment team has the opportunity to obtain more detailed information from the various meetings that are held on-site, including in relation to ML and TF risks and vulnerabilities, and to cross check responses provided by government with the various associations and bodies from the private sector. Assessors should also note that it is permissible to use criteria from one recommendation to assess the effectiveness of implementation of other recommendations. For example, the resources available to an agency tasked to combat money laundering or terrorist financing (c.30.1), would usually also be relevant to the effectiveness of that agency e.g. financial supervisor body (R.23), FIU (R.26) etc.

General Interpretation and Guidance

19. A full set of definitions from the FATF Recommendations, together with some additional terms that are employed in this Methodology, are at Annex 1. Assessors should be fully familiar with the meaning of all these terms, and in particular those terms that are used throughout the Methodology, such as: consider, country, designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP), financial institutions, financing of terrorism (FT), legal persons and legal arrangements. The term financial institutions is particularly fundamental to any AML/CFT assessment, and one of the starting points for all assessments will entail assessors developing a thorough understanding of the types of financial institutions that engage in the financial activities referred to in the definition. Assessors should also take note of the following guidance on other points of general interpretation, which is important to ensure consistency of approach.

20. Risk of money laundering or terrorist financing - For each Recommendation and each essential criteria where financial institutions should be required to take certain actions, assessors should normally assess compliance on the basis that all financial institutions should have to meet all the specified requirements. However, an important consideration underlying the FATF Recommendations is the degree of risk of money laundering or terrorist financing for particular types of financial institutions or for particular types of customers, products or transactions. A country may therefore take risk into account and may decide to limit the application of certain FATF Recommendations provided that either of the following conditions are met:

(a) When a financial activity referred to in the definition of “financial institution” as defined in the Glossary is carried out on an occasional or very limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such that there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing activity occurring.

(b) In other circumstances where there is a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the requirements in one or more Recommendations. However, this should only be done on a strictly limited and justified basis. For the purposes of this Methodology, assessors should be satisfied as to the adequacy of the process to determine low risk and the reasonableness of the conclusions.
21. In Recommendation 5 there are a number of criteria which allow countries to permit their financial institutions to take risk into account when determining the extent of the customer due diligence measures that the institution must take. This should not allow financial institutions to completely avoid doing the required measures, but could allow them to reduce or simplify the measures they have to take for certain criteria. Assessors need to be satisfied that there is an adequate mechanism by which competent authorities assess or review the procedures adopted by financial institutions to determine the degree of risk and how they manage that risk, as well as to review the determinations made by institutions.

22. In Recommendations 5 and 9, reference is made to a financial institution being satisfied as to a matter. This also requires that the institution must be able to justify its assessment to competent authorities, and that assessors need to be satisfied that there is an adequate mechanism by which competent authorities can review the assessments of financial institutions.

23. Requirements for financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions - The FATF Recommendations state that financial institutions or designated non-financial businesses and professions “should” or “should be required by law or regulation to” take certain actions. These references require countries or their competent authorities to take measures that will oblige their financial institutions or designated non-financial businesses and professions to comply with each of the relevant Recommendations. In the Methodology, in order to use one consistent phrase, the criteria relevant to financial institutions use the phrase “Financial institutions should be required” (a similar approach is taken for designated non-financial businesses).

24. Law or regulation or other enforceable means - The Interpretative Notes also require that “The basic obligations under Recommendations 5, 10 and 13 should be set out in law or regulation”. Law or regulation refers to primary and secondary legislation, such as laws, decrees, implementing regulations or other similar requirements, issued or authorised by a legislative body, and which impose mandatory requirements with sanctions for non-compliance. Other enforceable means refers to guidelines, instructions or other documents or mechanisms that set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance, and which are issued by a competent authority (e.g. a financial supervisory authority) or an SRO. In both cases, the sanctions for non-compliance should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive (see R.17). The Methodology criteria in respect of Recommendations 5, 10 and 13 that are basic obligations are marked with an asterisk (*). More detailed elements in the criteria in respect of Recommendations 5, 10 and 13, as well as obligations under Recommendations 6-9, 11, 14-15, 18, and 21-22 could be required either by law or regulation or by other enforceable means.

25. Assessment for designated non-financial businesses and professions - Under Recommendations 12 and 16 designated non-financial businesses and professions should be required to take certain actions. Assessors should assess compliance on the basis that all the designated categories of non-financial businesses and professions should meet the requirements set out in the Recommendation. However, it is not necessary to require these actions through laws, regulations or other enforceable means that relate exclusively to lawyers, notaries, accountants and the other designated non-financial businesses and professions so long as these businesses or professions are included in laws, regulations or other enforceable means covering the underlying activities. Assessors should note that compliance by designated non-financial businesses and professions with all the necessary AML/CFT measures is to be assessed only under Recommendations 12 & 16, and not under other Recommendations. Failure by a country to extend the AML/CFT obligations to such businesses and professions should not be reflected in the assessment of the other Recommendations. In determining whether laws, regulations or other enforceable means should be used for particular criteria, assessors should take a corresponding approach to that used for financial institutions.
THE FORTY RECOMMENDATIONS
ESSENTIAL CRITERIA AND ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS

A. LEGAL SYSTEMS

Scope of the Criminal Offence of Money Laundering

Recommendation 1

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 1 and Special Recommendation II. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 1.3 – 1.6 and Criteria II.2 – II.3 (in SR.II) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

1.1 Money laundering should be criminalised on the basis of the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention) and the 2000 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) i.e. the physical and material elements of the offence (see Article 3(1)(b)&(c) Vienna Convention and Article 6(1) Palermo Convention).

1.2 The offence of ML should extend to any type of property, regardless of its value, that directly or indirectly represents the proceeds of crime.

1.2.1 When proving that property is the proceeds of crime it should not be necessary that a person be convicted of a predicate offence.

1.3 The predicate offences for money laundering should cover all serious offences, and countries should seek to extend this to the widest range of predicate offences. At a minimum, predicate offences should include a range of offences in each of the designated categories of offences. Where the designated category is limited to a specific offence, then that offence must be covered.

1.4 Where countries apply a threshold approach or a combined approach that includes a threshold approach, predicate offences should at a minimum comprise all offences:

   a) which fall within the category of serious offences under their national law; or
   b) which are punishable by a maximum penalty of more than one year’s imprisonment; or
   c) which are punished by a minimum penalty of more than six months imprisonment (for countries that have a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system).

Examples of categories of serious offences include: “indictable offences” (as opposed to summary offences), “felonies” (as opposed to misdemeanours); “crimes” (as opposed to délits).

1.5 Predicate offences for money laundering should extend to conduct that occurred in another country, which constitutes an offence in that country, and which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically.

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2 This criterion applies at any stage of the proceedings, including when a decision is being made whether to initiate proceedings.

3 Note to assessors: R.1 does not require countries to create a separate offence of “participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering”. In order to cover this category of “designated offence” (c.1.3), it is sufficient if a country meets either of the two options set out in the Palermo Convention i.e. either a separate offence or an offence based on conspiracy.

4 Countries determine the underlying predicate offences for money laundering by reference to (a) all offences, or (b) to a threshold linked either to a category of serious offences or to the penalty of imprisonment applicable to the predicate offence (threshold approach), or (c) to a list of predicate offences, or (d) a combination of these approaches.
1.6 The offence of money laundering should apply to persons who commit the predicate offence. However, countries may provide that the offence of money laundering does not apply to persons who committed the predicate offence, where this is required by fundamental principles of their domestic law.

1.7 There should be appropriate ancillary offences to the offence of money laundering, including conspiracy to commit, attempt, aiding and abetting, facilitating, and counselling the commission, unless this is not permitted by fundamental principles of domestic law.

**Additional elements**

1.8 Where the proceeds of crime are derived from conduct that occurred in another country, which is not an offence in that other country but which would have constituted a predicate offence had it occurred domestically, does this constitute a money laundering offence?
**Recommendation 2**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 2.

**Essential criteria**

2.1 The offence of ML should apply at least to natural persons that knowingly engage in ML activity.

2.2 The law should permit the intentional element of the offence of ML to be inferred from objective factual circumstances.

2.3 Criminal liability for ML should extend to legal persons. Where that is not possible (i.e. due to fundamental principles of domestic law), civil or administrative liability should apply.

2.4 Making legal persons subject to criminal liability for ML should not preclude the possibility of parallel criminal, civil or administrative proceedings in countries in which more than one form of liability is available.

2.5 Natural and legal persons should be subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions for ML.  

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5 Note to assessors: In assessing whether criminal penalties are effective, proportionate and dissuasive (c.2.5) assessors should consider:
- The level of penalties (imprisonment/fines) for the offence relative to other serious offences in the assessed country;
- The level of penalties (imprisonment/fines) for ML/TF offences relative to ML/TF offences in other countries;
- The penalties actually imposed by the courts for ML/TF offences.
Provisional Measures and Confiscation

Recommendation 3

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 3.1 – 3.4, Criterion 3.6 and Criterion III.11 (in SR.III) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

3.1 Laws should provide for the confiscation of property that has been laundered or which constitutes:

   a) proceeds from;
   b) instrumentalities used in; and
   c) instrumentalities intended for use in

the commission of any ML, FT or other predicate offences, and property of corresponding value.

3.1.1 Criterion 3.1 should equally apply:

   (a) to property that is derived directly or indirectly from proceeds of crime; including income, profits or other benefits from the proceeds of crime; and
   (b) subject to criterion 3.5, to all the property referred to above, regardless of whether it is held or owned by a criminal defendant or by a third party.

All the property referred to in criteria 3.1 and 3.1.1 above is hereafter referred to as “property subject to confiscation”.

3.2 Laws and other measures should provide for provisional measures, including the freezing and/or seizing of property, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of property subject to confiscation.

3.3 Laws or measures should allow the initial application to freeze or seize property subject to confiscation to be made ex-parte or without prior notice, unless this is inconsistent with fundamental principles of domestic law.

3.4 Law enforcement agencies, the FIU or other competent authorities should be given adequate powers to identify and trace property that is, or may become subject to confiscation or is suspected of being the proceeds of crime.

3.5 Laws and other measures should provide protection for the rights of bona fide third parties. Such protection should be consistent with the standards provided in the Palermo Convention.

3.6 There should be authority to take steps to prevent or void actions, whether contractual or otherwise, where the persons involved knew or should have known that as a result of those actions the authorities would be prejudiced in their ability to recover property subject to confiscation.

Additional elements

3.7 Do laws provide for the confiscation of:

   a) The property of organisations that are found to be primarily criminal in nature (i.e. organisations whose principal function is to perform or assist in the performance of illegal activities)?
   b) Property subject to confiscation, but without a conviction of any person (civil forfeiture), in addition to the system of confiscation triggered by a criminal conviction?
   c) Property subject to confiscation, and which require an offender to demonstrate the lawful origin of the property?
B. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN BY FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND PROFESSIONS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

Recommendation 4

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 4.

Essential criteria

4.1 Countries should ensure that no financial institution secrecy law will inhibit the implementation of the FATF Recommendations. Areas where this may be of particular concern are the ability of competent authorities to access information they require to properly perform their functions in combating ML or FT; the sharing of information between competent authorities, either domestically or internationally; and the sharing of information between financial institutions where this is required by R.7, R.9 or SR.VII.
Customer Due Diligence and Record-keeping

Recommendation 5

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendations 5 and 8, Special Recommendation VII, the Interpretative Notes to Recommendation 5, 12 and 16, and to Recommendation 5. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 5.2 – 5.3 and Criterion VII.1 (in SR.VII) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

5.1* Financial institutions should not be permitted to keep anonymous accounts or accounts in fictitious names.

Where numbered accounts exist, financial institutions should be required to maintain them in such a way that full compliance can be achieved with the FATF Recommendations. For example, the financial institution should properly identify the customer in accordance with these criteria, and the customer identification records should be available to the AML/CFT compliance officer, other appropriate staff and competent authorities.

When CDD is required

5.2* Financial institutions should be required to undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when:

a) establishing business relations;
b) carrying out occasional transactions above the applicable designated threshold (USD/€15,000). This also includes situations where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked;
c) carrying out occasional transactions that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretative Note to SR VII;
d) there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of any exemptions or thresholds that are referred to elsewhere under the FATF Recommendations; or
e) the financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer identification data.

Required CDD measures

5.3* Financial institutions should be required to identify the customer (whether permanent or occasional, and whether natural or legal persons or legal arrangements) and verify that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source documents, data or information (identification data).

5.4 For customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, the financial institution should be required to:

   (a)* verify that any person purporting to act on behalf of the customer is so authorised, and identify and verify the identity of that person; and
   (b) verify the legal status of the legal person or legal arrangement, e.g. by obtaining proof of incorporation or similar evidence of establishment or existence, and obtain information

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6 Financial institutions do not have to repeatedly perform identification and verification every time that a customer conducts a transaction.

7 The general rule is that customers should be subject to the full range of CDD measures. However, there are circumstances in which it would be reasonable for a country to allow its financial institutions to apply the extent of the CDD measures on a risk sensitive basis.

8 Examples of the types of customer information that could be obtained, and the identification data that could be used to verify that information is set out in the paper entitled General Guide to Account Opening and Customer Identification issued by the Basel Committee’s Working Group on Cross Border Banking.
concerning the customer’s name, the names of trustees (for trusts), legal form, address, directors (for legal persons), and provisions regulating the power to bind the legal person or arrangement.

5.5* Financial institutions should be required to identify the beneficial owner, and take reasonable measures to verify the identity of the beneficial owner⁹ using relevant information or data obtained from a reliable source such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is.

5.5.1* For all customers, the financial institution should determine whether the customer is acting on behalf of another person, and should then take reasonable steps to obtain sufficient identification data to verify the identity of that other person.

5.5.2 For customers that are legal persons or legal arrangements, the financial institution should be required to take reasonable measures to:

(a) understand the ownership and control structure of the customer;
(b)* determine who are the natural persons that ultimately own or control the customer. This includes those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.

Examples of the types of measures that would be normally needed to satisfactorily perform this function include:
- For companies - identifying the natural persons with a controlling interest and the natural persons who comprise the mind and management of company.
- For trusts - identifying the settlor, the trustee or person exercising effective control over the trust, and the beneficiaries.

Note to assessors: where the customer or the owner of the controlling interest is a public company that is subject to regulatory disclosure requirements i.e. a public company listed on a recognised stock exchange, it is not necessary to seek to identify and verify the identity of the shareholders of that public company.

5.6 Financial institutions should be required to obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.

5.7* Financial institutions should be required to conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship.

5.7.1 Ongoing due diligence should include scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, and where necessary, the source of funds.

5.7.2 Financial institutions should be required to ensure that documents, data or information collected under the CDD process is kept up-to-date and relevant by undertaking reviews of existing records, particularly for higher risk categories of customers or business relationships.

⁹ For life and other investment linked insurance, the beneficiary under the policy must also be identified and verified. See criteria 5.14 concerning the timing of such measures.
Risk

5.8 Financial institutions should be required to perform enhanced due diligence for higher risk categories of customer, business relationship or transaction.

Examples of higher risk categories (which are derived from the Basel CDD Paper) may include:

- a) Non-resident customers,
- b) Private banking,
- c) Legal persons or arrangements such as trusts that are personal assets holding vehicles,
- d) Companies that have nominee shareholders or shares in bearer form.

Types of enhanced due diligence measures may include those set out in Recommendation 6.

5.9 Where there are low risks, countries may decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or simplified measures. The general rule is that customers must be subject to the full range of CDD measures, including the requirement to identify the beneficial owner. Nevertheless, there are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing is lower, where information on the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner of a customer is publicly available, or where adequate checks and controls exist elsewhere in national systems. In such circumstances it could be reasonable for a country to allow its financial institutions to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures when identifying and verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner.

Examples of customers, transactions or products where the risk may be lower could include:

- a) Financial institutions – provided that they are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and are supervised for compliance with those requirements.
- b) Public companies that are subject to regulatory disclosure requirements. This refers to companies that are listed on a stock exchange or similar situations.
- c) Government administrations or enterprises.
- d) Life insurance policies where the annual premium is no more than USD/€1000 or a single premium of no more than USD/€2500.
- e) Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no surrender clause and the policy cannot be used as collateral.
- f) A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement benefits to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under the scheme.
- g) Beneficial owners of pooled accounts held by DNFBP provided that they are subject to requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing consistent with the FATF Recommendations and are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those requirements.

5.10 Where financial institutions are permitted to apply simplified or reduced CDD measures to customers resident in another country, this should be limited to countries that the original country is satisfied are in compliance with and have effectively implemented the FATF Recommendations.

5.11 Simplified CDD measures are not acceptable whenever there is suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing or specific higher risk scenarios apply.

5.12 Where financial institutions are permitted to determine the extent of the CDD measures on a risk sensitive basis, this should be consistent with guidelines issued by the competent authorities.

10 Other examples of higher risk are included in Recommendations 6 and 7.

11 Assessors should determine in each case whether the risks are lower having regard to the type of customer, product or transaction, or the location of the customer.
Timing of verification

5.13 Financial institutions should be required to verify the identity of the customer and beneficial owner before or during the course of establishing a business relationship or conducting transactions for occasional customers.

5.14 Countries may permit financial institutions to complete the verification of the identity of the customer and beneficial owner following the establishment of the business relationship, provided that:

(a) This occurs as soon as reasonably practicable.
(b) This is essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business.
(c) The money laundering risks are effectively managed.

Examples of situations where it may be essential not to interrupt the normal conduct of business are:

- Non face-to-face business.
- Securities transactions. In the securities industry, companies and intermediaries may be required to perform transactions very rapidly, according to the market conditions at the time the customer is contacting them, and the performance of the transaction may be required before verification of identity is completed.
- Life insurance business – in relation to identification and verification of the beneficiary under the policy. This may take place after the business relationship with the policyholder is established, but in all such cases, identification and verification should occur at or before the time of payout or the time when the beneficiary intends to exercise vested rights under the policy.

5.14.1 Where a customer is permitted to utilise the business relationship prior to verification, financial institutions should be required to adopt risk management procedures concerning the conditions under which this may occur. These procedures should include a set of measures such as a limitation of the number, types and/or amount of transactions that can be performed and the monitoring of large or complex transactions being carried out outside of expected norms for that type of relationship.

Failure to satisfactorily complete CDD

5.15 Where the financial institution is unable to comply with Criteria 5.3 to 5.6 above:

a) it should not be permitted to open the account, commence business relations or perform the transaction;

b) it should consider making a suspicious transaction report.

5.16 Where the financial institution has already commenced the business relationship e.g. when Criteria 5.2(e), 5.14 or 5.17 apply, and the financial institution is unable to comply with Criteria 5.3 to 5.5 above it should be required to terminate the business relationship and to consider making a suspicious transaction report.
Existing customers

5.17 Financial institutions should be required to apply CDD requirements to existing customers\(^{12}\) on the basis of materiality and risk and to conduct due diligence on such existing relationships at appropriate times.

For financial institutions engaged in banking business (and for other financial institutions where relevant) - examples of when it may otherwise be an appropriate time to do so is when: (a) a transaction of significance takes place, (b) customer documentation standards change substantially, (c) there is a material change in the way that the account is operated, (d) the institution becomes aware that it lacks sufficient information about an existing customer.

5.18 Financial institutions should be required to perform CDD measures on existing customers if they are customers to whom Criterion 5.1 applies.

\(^{12}\) Existing customers as at the date that the national requirements are brought into force.
**Recommendation 6**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 6 and its Interpretative Note.

**Essential criteria**

6.1 Financial institutions should be required, in addition to performing the CDD measures required under R.5, to put in place appropriate risk management systems to determine whether a potential customer, a customer or the beneficial owner is a politically exposed person.

Examples of measures that could form part of such a risk management system include seeking relevant information from the customer, referring to publicly available information or having access to commercial electronic databases of PEPS.

6.2 Financial institutions should be required to obtain senior management approval for establishing business relationships with a PEP.

6.2.1 Where a customer has been accepted and the customer or beneficial owner is subsequently found to be, or subsequently becomes a PEP, financial institutions should be required to obtain senior management approval to continue the business relationship.

6.3 Financial institutions should be required to take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and the source of funds of customers and beneficial owners identified as PEPS.

6.4 Where financial institutions are in a business relationship with a PEP, they should be required to conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring on that relationship.

**Additional elements**

6.5 Are the requirements of R.6 extended to PEPS who hold prominent public functions domestically?

6.6 Has the 2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption been signed, ratified, and fully implemented?
Recommendation 7

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 7.

Essential criteria

In relation to cross-border correspondent banking and other similar relationships financial institutions should, in addition to performing any CDD measures that may be required under R.5, be required to take the measures set out in Criteria 7.1-7.5.

7.1 Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the nature of the respondent’s business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action.

7.2 Assess the respondent institution’s AML/CFT controls, and ascertain that they are adequate and effective.

7.3 Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new correspondent relationships.

7.4 Document the respective AML/CFT responsibilities of each institution.

7.5 Where a correspondent relationship involves the maintenance of “payable-through accounts”, financial institutions should be satisfied that:

(a) their customer (the respondent financial institution) has performed all the normal CDD obligations set out in R.5 on those of its customers that have direct access to the accounts of the correspondent financial institution; and
(b) the respondent financial institution is able to provide relevant customer identification data upon request to the correspondent financial institution.

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13 Similar relationships to which financial institutions should apply Criteria 7.1-7.5 include for example those established for securities transactions or funds transfers, whether for the cross-border financial institution as principal or for its customers.

14 It is not necessary that the two financial institutions always have to reduce the respective responsibilities into a written form provided there is a clear understanding as to which institution will perform the required measures.
**Recommendation 8**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 8.

**Essential criteria**

8.1 Financial institutions should be required to have policies in place or take such measures as may be needed to prevent the misuse of technological developments in money laundering or terrorist financing schemes.

8.2 Financial institutions should be required to have policies and procedures in place to address any specific risks associated with non-face to face business relationships or transactions. These policies and procedures should apply when establishing customer relationships and when conducting ongoing due diligence.

Examples of non-face to face operations include: business relationships concluded over the Internet or by other means such as through the post; services and transactions over the Internet including trading in securities by retail investors over the Internet or other interactive computer services; use of ATM machines; telephone banking; transmission of instructions or applications via facsimile or similar means and making payments and receiving cash withdrawals as part of electronic point of sale transaction using prepaid or reloadable or account-linked value cards.

8.2.1 Measures for managing the risks should include specific and effective CDD procedures that apply to non-face to face customers.

Examples of such procedures include: the certification of documents presented; the requisition of additional documents to complement those which are required for face-to-face customers; develop independent contact with the customer; rely on third party introduction (see criteria 9.1 to 9.5) and require the first payment to be carried out through an account in the customer’s name with another bank subject to similar customer due diligence standards.

Financial institutions should refer to the CDD Paper, Section 2.2.6.

For electronic services, financial institutions could refer to the “Risk Management Principles for Electronic Banking” issued by the Basel Committee in July 2003.
**Recommendation 9**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 9 and its Interpretative Note.

Note: This Recommendation does not apply to:

(a) outsourcing or agency relationships, i.e. where the agent is acting under a contractual arrangement with the financial institution to carry out its CDD functions;  
(b) business relationships, accounts or transactions between financial institutions for their clients. These are addressed by R.5 and R.7.

**Essential criteria**

If financial institutions are permitted to rely on intermediaries or other third parties to perform some of the elements of the CDD process (Criteria 5.3 to 5.6) or to introduce business, then the following criteria should be met.

9.1 Financial institutions relying upon a third party should be required to immediately obtain from the third party the necessary information concerning certain elements of the CDD process (Criteria 5.3 to 5.6).

9.2 Financial institutions should be required to take adequate steps to satisfy themselves that copies of identification data and other relevant documentation relating to CDD requirements will be made available from the third party upon request without delay.

9.3 Financial institutions should be required to satisfy themselves that the third party is regulated and supervised (in accordance with Recommendation 23, 24 and 29), and has measures in place to comply with, the CDD requirements set out in R.5 and R.10.

9.4 In determining in which countries the third party that meets the conditions can be based, competent authorities should take into account information available on whether those countries adequately apply the FATF Recommendations.

9.5 The ultimate responsibility for customer identification and verification should remain with the financial institution relying on the third party.

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15 Where there is a contract to outsource CDD, R.9 does not apply because the outsource or agent is to be regarded as synonymous with the financial institution i.e. the processes and documentation are those of the financial institution itself.

16 In practice, this reliance on third parties often occurs through introductions made by another member of the same financial services group, or in some jurisdictions from another financial institution or third party. It may also occur in business relationships between insurance companies and insurance brokers/agents, or between mortgage providers and brokers.

17 It is not necessary to obtain copies of documentation.

18 Countries could refer to reports, assessments or reviews concerning AML/CFT that are published by the FATF, FSRBs, the IMF or World Bank.
**Recommendation 10**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 10 and its Interpretative Note.

**Essential criteria**

10.1* Financial institutions should be required to maintain all necessary records on transactions, both domestic and international, for at least five years following completion of the transaction (or longer if requested by a competent authority in specific cases and upon proper authority). This requirement applies regardless of whether the account or business relationship is ongoing or has been terminated.

10.1.1 Transaction records should be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for prosecution of criminal activity.

Examples of the necessary components of transaction records include: customer’s (and beneficiary’s) name, address (or other identifying information normally recorded by the intermediary), the nature and date of the transaction, the type and amount of currency involved, and the type and identifying number of any account involved in the transaction.

10.2* Financial institutions should be required to maintain records of the identification data, account files and business correspondence for at least five years following the termination of an account or business relationship (or longer if requested by a competent authority in specific cases upon proper authority).

10.3* Financial institutions should be required to ensure that all customer and transaction records and information are available on a timely basis to domestic competent authorities upon appropriate authority.
Recommendation 11

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 11 and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

11.1 Financial institutions should be required to pay special attention to all complex, unusual large transactions, or unusual patterns of transactions, that have no apparent or visible economic or lawful purpose.

Examples of such transactions or patterns of transactions include: significant transactions relative to a relationship, transactions that exceed certain limits, very high account turnover inconsistent with the size of the balance, or transactions which fall out of the regular pattern of the account’s activity.

11.2 Financial institutions should be required to examine as far as possible the background and purpose of such transactions and to set forth their findings in writing.

11.3 Financial institutions should be required to keep such findings available for competent authorities and auditors for at least five years.
**Recommendation 12**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 12, the Interpretative Note to R.5, 12 & 16, and the essential criteria and the additional elements for Recommendations 5, 6 and 8-11.

**Essential criteria**

12.1 DNFBP should be required to comply with the requirements set out in Recommendation 5 (Criteria 5.1 – 5.18) in the following circumstances:

a) Casinos (including internet casinos) – when their customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above USD/€ 3,000.

Examples of financial transactions in casinos include: the purchase or cashing in of casino chips or tokens, the opening of accounts, wire transfers and currency exchanges. Financial transactions do not refer to gambling transactions that involve only casino chips or tokens.

b) Real estate agents – when they are involved in transactions for a client concerning the buying and selling of real estate.

c) Dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones – when they engage in any cash transaction with a customer equal to or above USD/€ 15,000.

d) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants when they prepare for or carry out transactions for a client in relation to the following activities:

- buying and selling of real estate;
- managing of client money, securities or other assets;
- management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
- organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies;
- creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.

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19 The designated thresholds applied in these criteria are referred to in the IN of R. 5, 12 and 16.

20 Countries should establish rules to determine the basis upon which internet casinos are subject to national AML/CFT requirements. This will require the country to determine the basis or set or factors upon which it will decide whether there is a sufficient nexus or connection between the internet casino and the country. Examples of such factors include incorporation or organisation under the laws of the country, or place of effective management within the country. Assessors should examine the basis for the nexus or connection, with respect to R.12, 16 and 24.

21 Note to assessors: Recommendation 12 (c.12.1) requires casinos (including internet casinos) to implement Recommendation 5, including identifying and verifying the identity of customers, when their customers engage in financial transactions equal to or above USD/€ 3,000. Conducting customer identification at the entry to a casino could be, but is not necessarily, sufficient. Countries must require casinos to ensure that they are able to link customer due diligence information for a particular customer to the transactions that the customer conducts in the casino.

22 The designated thresholds of USD/€ 3,000 and USD/€ 15,000 include situations where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked.

23 This means that real estate agents should comply with R.5 with respect to both the purchasers and the vendors of the property.

24 Where the lawyer, notary, other independent legal professional or accountant is conducting financial activity as a business and meets the definition of “financial institution” then that person or firm should comply with the requirements applicable to financial institutions.
e) Trust and Company Service Providers when they prepare for and when they carry out transactions for a client in relation to the following activities:

- acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
- acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons;
- providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement;
- acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust;
- acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.

DNFBP should especially comply with the CDD measures set out in Criteria 5.3 to 5.7 but may determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type of customer, business relationship or transaction.

12.2 In the circumstances set out in Criterion 12.1, DNFBP should be required to comply with the criteria set out under Recommendations 6 and 8-11.
Reporting of Suspicious Transactions and Compliance

Recommendation 13

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 1, Recommendation 13 and its Interpretative Note, and the text of Special Recommendation IV. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 13.1 – 13.4 and Criteria IV.1 – IV.2 (in SR.IV) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

13.1* A financial institution should be required by law or regulation to report to the FIU (a suspicious transaction report – STR) when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity. At a minimum, the obligation to make a STR should apply to funds that are the proceeds of all offences that are required to be included as predicate offences under Recommendation 1. This requirement should be a direct mandatory obligation, and any indirect or implicit obligation to report suspicious transactions, whether by reason of possible prosecution for a ML offence or otherwise (so called “indirect reporting”), is not acceptable.

13.2* The obligation to make a STR also applies to funds where there are reasonable grounds to suspect or they are suspected to be linked or related to, or to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations or those who finance terrorism.

13.3* All suspicious transactions, including attempted transactions, should be reported regardless of the amount of the transaction.

13.4 The requirement to report suspicious transactions should apply regardless of whether they are thought, among other things, to involve tax matters.

Additional elements

13.5 Are financial institutions required to report to the FIU when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate offence for money laundering domestically?

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*The requirement to report when the individual “suspects” is a subjective test of suspicion i.e. the person actually suspected that a transaction involved a criminal activity. A requirement to report when there are “reasonable grounds to suspect” is an objective test of suspicion and can be satisfied if the circumstances surrounding the transaction would lead a reasonable person to suspect that the transaction involved a criminal activity. This requirement implies that countries may choose either the two alternatives, but need not have both.
**Recommendation 14**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 14 and its Interpretative Note.

**Essential criteria**

14.1. Financial institutions and their directors, officers and employees (permanent and temporary) should be protected by law from both criminal and civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, if they report their suspicions in good faith to the FIU. This protection should be available even if they did not know precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal activity actually occurred.

14.2. Financial institutions and their directors, officers and employees (permanent and temporary) should be prohibited by law from disclosing (“tipping off”) the fact that a STR or related information is being reported or provided to the FIU.

**Additional elements**

14.3 Do laws or regulations or any other measures ensure that the names and personal details of staff of financial institutions that make a STR are kept confidential by the FIU?
Recommendation 15

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 15 and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

The type and extent of measures to be taken for each of the requirements set out below should be appropriate having regard to the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing and the size of the business.

15.1 Financial institutions should be required to establish and maintain internal procedures, policies and controls to prevent ML and FT, and to communicate these to their employees. These procedures, policies and controls should cover, inter alia, CDD, record retention, the detection of unusual and suspicious transactions and the reporting obligation.

15.1.1 Financial institutions should be required to develop appropriate compliance management arrangements e.g. for financial institutions at a minimum the designation of an AML/CFT compliance officer at the management level.

15.1.2 The AML/CFT compliance officer and other appropriate staff should have timely access to customer identification data and other CDD information, transaction records, and other relevant information.

15.2 Financial institutions should be required to maintain an adequately resourced and independent audit function to test compliance (including sample testing) with these procedures, policies and controls.

15.3 Financial institutions should be required to establish ongoing employee training to ensure that employees are kept informed of new developments, including information on current ML and FT techniques, methods and trends; and that there is a clear explanation of all aspects of AML/CFT laws and obligations, and in particular, requirements concerning CDD and suspicious transaction reporting.

15.4. Financial institutions should be required to put in place screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees.

Additional elements

15.5 Is the AML/CFT compliance officer able to act independently and to report to senior management above the compliance officer’s next reporting level or the board of directors?
Recommendation 16

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 16 and its Interpretative Note, Recommendations 13-15 and their Interpretative Notes and their essential criteria / additional elements, and Special Recommendation IV.

Essential criteria

16.1 DNFBP should be required to comply with the requirements set out in Recommendation 13 (Criteria 13.1 – 13.4)\(^{26}\) in the following circumstances:

a) Casinos (which includes internet casinos) and real estate agents – in the circumstances set out in R.13.

b) Dealers in precious metals or stones - when they engage in any cash transaction equal to or above USD/€ 15,000\(^{27}\).

c) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants - when, on behalf of or for a client, they engage in a financial transaction in relation to the following activities:

- buying and selling of real estate;
- managing of client money, securities or other assets;
- management of bank, savings or securities accounts;
- organisation of contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies;
- creation, operation or management of legal persons or arrangements, and buying and selling of business entities.

Note on legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy.

Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as independent legal professionals, are not required to report suspicious transactions if the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where they are subject to legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy.

It is for each jurisdiction to determine the matters that would fall under legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy. This would normally cover information lawyers, notaries or other independent legal professionals receive from or obtain through one of their clients: (a) in the course of ascertaining the legal position of their client, or (b) in performing their task of defending or representing that client in, or concerning judicial, administrative, arbitration or mediation proceedings. Where accountants are subject to the same obligations of secrecy or privilege, then they are also not required to report suspicious transactions.

d) Trust and Company Service Providers - when they prepare for or carry out a transaction on behalf of a client, in relation to the following activities:

- acting as a formation agent of legal persons;
- acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons;

\(^{26}\) DNFBP should comply with all the criteria in Recommendation 13 with two exceptions. First, dealers in precious metals and stones must comply with criteria 13.3, but would only be required to report transactions (or attempted transactions) above the cash threshold of USD/€ 15,000. Second, as detailed in criteria 16.1, countries may allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals, and accountants acting as independent legal professionals to send their STR to self-regulatory organizations, and they do not always need to send STR to the FIU.

\(^{27}\) The designated threshold includes situations where the transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked (cases of “smurfing”/”structuring”).
• providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement;
• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust;
• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.

16.2 Where countries allow lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants to send their STR to their appropriate self-regulatory organisations (SRO), there should be appropriate forms of co-operation between these organisations and the FIU. Each country should determine the details of how the SRO could co-operate with the FIU.

16.3 In the circumstances set out in criterion 16.1, the criteria set out under Recommendations 14, 15 and 21 should apply in relation to DNFBP.

Additional elements

16.5 Is the reporting requirement extended to the rest of the professional activities of accountants, including auditing?

16.6 Are DNFBP required to report to the FIU when they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of all criminal acts that would constitute a predicate offence for money laundering domestically?
Other Measures to Deter Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Recommendation 17

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 17, Special Recommendations IV, VI and VII. (Note to assessors: Ensure that Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 and Criterion VI.5 (in SR.VI) and Criterion VII.9 (in SR.VII) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

17.1 Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions are available to deal with natural or legal persons covered by the FATF Recommendations that fail to comply with national AML/CFT requirements.

17.2 Countries should designate an authority (e.g. supervisors or the FIU) empowered to apply these sanctions. Different authorities may be responsible for applying sanctions depending on the nature of the requirement that was not complied with.

17.3 Sanctions should be available in relation not only to the legal persons that are financial institutions or businesses but also to their directors and senior management.

17.4 The range of sanctions available should be broad and proportionate to the severity of a situation. They should include the power to impose disciplinary and financial sanctions and the power to withdraw, restrict or suspend the financial institution’s license, where applicable.

Examples of types of sanctions include: written warnings (separate letter or within an audit report), orders to comply with specific instructions (possibly accompanied with daily fines for non-compliance), ordering regular reports from the institution on the measures it is taking, fines for non-compliance, barring individuals from employment within that sector, replacing or restricting the powers of managers, directors, or controlling owners, imposing conservatorship or a suspension or withdrawal of the license, or criminal penalties where permitted.
Recommendation 18

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 18.

Essential criteria

18.1 Countries should not approve the establishment or accept the continued operation of shell banks.

18.2 Financial institutions should not be permitted to enter into, or continue, correspondent banking relationships with shell banks.

18.3 Financial institutions should be required to satisfy themselves that respondent financial institutions in a foreign country do not permit their accounts to be used by shell banks.
**Recommendation 19**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 19.

**Essential criteria**

19.1 Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of implementing a system where financial institutions report all transactions in currency above a fixed threshold to a national central agency with a computerised database.

**Additional elements**

19.2 Where systems for reporting large currency transactions are in place, are the reports maintained in a computerised database, available to competent authorities for AML/CFT purposes?

19.3 Are the systems for reporting large currency transactions subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information or data that is reported or recorded?
Recommendation 20

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 20.

**Essential criteria**

20.1 Countries should consider applying Recommendations 5, 6, 8-11, 13-15, 17 and 21 to non-financial businesses and professions (other than DNFBP) that are at risk of being misused for money laundering or terrorist financing.

Examples of businesses or professions that may be at risk include: dealers in high value and luxury goods, pawnshops, gambling, auction houses and investment advisers.

20.2 Countries should take measures to encourage the development and use of modern and secure techniques for conducting financial transactions that are less vulnerable to money laundering.

Examples of techniques or measures that may be less vulnerable to money laundering include:

- Reducing reliance on cash;
- Not issuing very large denomination banknotes;
- Secured automated transfer systems.
**Recommendation 21**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 21.

**Essential criteria**

21.1 Financial institutions should be required to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with persons (including legal persons and other financial institutions) from or in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.

21.1.1 There should be effective measures in place to ensure that financial institutions are advised of concerns about weaknesses in the AML/CFT systems of other countries.

21.2 If those transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, the background and purpose of such transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, and written findings should be available to assist competent authorities (e.g. supervisors, law enforcement agencies and the FIU) and auditors.

21.3 Where a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply appropriate counter-measures.

Examples of possible counter-measures include:

- Stringent requirements for identifying clients and enhancement of advisories, including jurisdiction-specific financial advisories, to financial institutions for identification of the beneficial owners before business relationships are established with individuals or companies from these countries;
- Enhanced relevant reporting mechanisms or systematic reporting of financial transactions on the basis that financial transactions with such countries are more likely to be suspicious;
- In considering requests for approving the establishment in countries applying the countermeasure of subsidiaries or branches or representative offices of financial institutions, taking into account the fact that the relevant financial institution is from a country that does not have adequate AML/CFT systems;
- Warning non-financial sector businesses that transactions with natural or legal persons within that country might run the risk of money laundering;
- Limiting business relationships or financial transactions with the identified country or persons in that country.
**Recommendation 22**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 22.

**Essential criteria**

22.1 Financial institutions should be required to ensure that their foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures consistent with home country requirements and the FATF Recommendations, to the extent that local (i.e. host country) laws and regulations permit.

22.1.1 Financial institutions should be required to pay particular attention that this principle is observed with respect to their branches and subsidiaries in countries which do not or insufficiently apply the FATF Recommendations.

22.1.2 Where the minimum AML/CFT requirements of the home and host countries differ, branches and subsidiaries in host countries should be required to apply the higher standard, to the extent that local (i.e. host country) laws and regulations permit.

22.2 Financial institutions should be required to inform their home country supervisor when a foreign branch or subsidiary is unable to observe appropriate AML/CFT measures because this is prohibited by local (i.e. host country) laws, regulations or other measures.

**Additional elements**

22.3 Are financial institutions subject to the Core Principles required to apply consistent CDD measures at the group level, taking into account the activity of the customer with the various branches and majority owned subsidiaries worldwide?
**Recommendation 23**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 23, its Interpretative Note, the text of Special Recommendation VI, and its Interpretative Note.

Note to assessors: Assessors should use criterion 23.1 to assess the overall adequacy of the regulatory and supervisory system, and to note any deficiencies that are not dealt with in other criteria. Assessors may also wish to have regard to matters raised in assessments made with respect to the Core Principles.

**Essential criteria**

23.1 Countries should ensure that financial institutions are subject to adequate AML/CFT regulation and supervision and are effectively implementing the FATF Recommendations.

23.2 Countries should ensure that a designated competent authority or authorities has/have responsibility for ensuring that financial institutions adequately comply with the requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

23.3 Supervisors or other competent authorities should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest or holding a management function, including in the executive or supervisory boards, councils, etc in a financial institution.

23.3.1 Directors and senior management of financial institutions subject to the Core Principles should be evaluated on the basis of “fit and proper” criteria including those relating to expertise and integrity.

23.4 For financial institutions that are subject to the Core Principles the regulatory and supervisory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are also relevant to money laundering, should apply in a similar manner for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing purposes, except where specific criteria address the same issue in this Methodology.

Examples of regulatory and supervisory measures that apply for prudential purposes and which are also relevant to money laundering, include requirements for: (i) licensing and structure; (ii) risk management processes to identify, measure, monitor and control material risks; (iii) ongoing supervision and (iv) global consolidated supervision where required by the Core Principles.

23.5 Natural and legal persons providing a money or value transfer service, or a money or currency changing service should be licensed or registered.

23.6 Natural and legal persons providing a money or value transfer service, or a money or currency changing service should be subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with national requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

23.7 Financial institutions (other than those mentioned in Criterion 23.4) should be licensed or registered and appropriately regulated, and subject to supervision or oversight for AML/CFT purposes, having regard to the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector i.e. if there is a proven low risk then the required measures may be less.

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28 Note to assessors: refer to the Core Principles for a precise description of the financial institutions that are covered, but broadly speaking it refers to: (1) banking and other deposit-taking business, (2) insurers and insurance intermediaries, and (3) collective investment schemes and market intermediaries.
**Recommendation 24**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 24.

**Essential criteria**

24.1 Countries should ensure that casinos (including Internet casinos) are subject to a comprehensive regulatory and supervisory regime that ensures they are effectively implementing the AML/CFT measures required under the FATF Recommendations.

24.1.1 Countries should ensure that a designated competent authority has responsibility for the AML/CFT regulatory and supervisory regime. The competent authority should have adequate powers to perform its functions, including powers to monitor and sanction (countries should ensure that criteria 17.1-17.4 apply to the obligations under R.12 and R.16).

24.1.2 Casinos should be licensed by a designated competent authority.

24.1.3 A competent authority should take the necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent criminals or their associates from holding or being the beneficial owner of a significant or controlling interest, holding a management function in, or being an operator of a casino.

24.2 Countries should ensure that the other categories of DNFBP are subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with AML/CFT requirements. In determining whether the system for monitoring and ensuring compliance is appropriate, regard may be had to the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing in that sector i.e. if there is a proven low risk then the extent of the required measures may be less.

24.2.1 There should be a designated competent authority or SRO responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance of DNFBPs with AML/CFT requirements. Such an authority or SRO should have:

a) Adequate powers to perform its functions, including powers to monitor and sanction (countries should ensure that criteria 17.1-17.4 apply to the obligations under R.12 and R.16).

b) Sufficient technical and other resources to perform its functions.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{29}\) In assessing compliance with this criterion, assessors should have regard to Criteria 30.1 to 30.4 where it is appropriate to do so (i.e. depending on the type of the designated competent authority or SRO, its size, its responsibilities, etc).
Recommendation 25

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 25 and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

25.1 Competent authorities should establish guidelines that will assist financial institutions and DNFBP to implement and comply with their respective AML/CFT requirements. For DNFBP, such guidelines may be established by SROs.

At a minimum, the guidelines should give assistance on issues covered under the relevant FATF Recommendations, including: (i) a description of ML and FT techniques and methods; and (ii) any additional measures that these institutions and DNFBP could take to ensure that their AML/CFT measures are effective.

25.2 Competent authorities, and particularly the FIU, should provide financial institutions and DNFBP that are required to report suspicious transactions, with adequate and appropriate feedback having regard to the FATF Best Practice Guidelines on Providing Feedback to Reporting Financial Institutions and Other Persons.

Examples of appropriate feedback mechanisms (drawn from the Best Practices Paper) may include:

(i) general feedback - (a) statistics on the number of disclosures, with appropriate breakdowns, and on the results of the disclosures; (b) information on current techniques, methods and trends (typologies); and (c) sanitised examples of actual money laundering cases.

(ii) specific or case by case feedback - (a) acknowledgement of the receipt of the report; (b) subject to domestic legal principles, if a case is closed or completed, whether because of a concluded prosecution, because the report was found to relate to a legitimate transaction or for other reasons, and if the information is available, then the institution should receive information on that decision or result.
C. INSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER MEASURES NECESSARY IN SYSTEMS FOR
COMBATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING

Competent Authorities, their Powers and Resources

Recommendation 26

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 26 and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

26.1 Countries should establish an FIU that serves as a national centre for receiving (and if permitted, requesting), analysing, and disseminating disclosures of STR and other relevant information concerning suspected ML or FT activities. The FIU can be established either as an independent governmental authority or within an existing authority or authorities.

26.2 The FIU or another competent authority should provide financial institutions and other reporting parties with guidance regarding the manner of reporting, including the specification of reporting forms, and the procedures that should be followed when reporting.

26.3 The FIU should have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly undertake its functions, including the analysis of STR.

26.4 The FIU, either directly or through another competent authority, should be authorised to obtain from reporting parties additional information needed to properly undertake its functions.

26.5 The FIU should be authorised to disseminate financial information to domestic authorities for investigation or action when there are grounds to suspect ML or FT.

26.6 The FIU should have sufficient operational independence and autonomy to ensure that it is free from undue influence or interference.

26.7 Information held by the FIU should be securely protected and disseminated only in accordance with the law.

26.8 The FIU should publicly release periodic reports, and such reports should include statistics, typologies and trends as well as information regarding its activities.

26.9 Where a country has created an FIU, it should consider applying for membership in the Egmont Group.

26.10 Countries should have regard to the Egmont Group Statement of Purpose and its Principles for Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units for Money Laundering Cases (these documents set out important guidance concerning the role and functions of FIUs, and the mechanisms for exchanging information between FIU).
Recommendation 27

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 27 and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

27.1 There should be designated law enforcement authorities that have responsibility for ensuring that ML and FT offences are properly investigated.

27.2 Countries should consider taking measures, whether legislative or otherwise, that allow competent authorities investigating ML cases to postpone or waive the arrest of suspected persons and/or the seizure of the money for the purpose of identifying persons involved in such activities or for evidence gathering.

Additional elements

27.3 Are measures in place, whether legislative or otherwise, that provide law enforcement or prosecution authorities with an adequate legal basis for the use of a wide range of special investigative techniques when conducting investigations of ML or FT (e.g. controlled delivery of the proceeds of crime or funds intended for use in terrorism, undercover operations, etc)?

27.4 Where special investigative techniques are permitted, are such techniques used when conducting investigations of ML, FT, and underlying predicate offences, and to what extent?

27.5 In addition to special investigative techniques, are the following effective mechanisms used?

(a) Permanent or temporary groups specialised in investigating the proceeds of crime (financial investigators)? An important component of the work of such groups or bodies would be focused on the investigation, seizure, freezing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime.

(b) Co-operative investigations with appropriate competent authorities in other countries, including the use of special investigative techniques, provided that adequate safeguards are in place?

27.6 Are ML and FT methods, techniques and trends reviewed by law enforcement authorities, the FIU and other competent authorities (as appropriate) on a regular, interagency basis? Are the resulting information, analyses or studies disseminated to law enforcement and FIU staff, as well as staff of other competent authorities?

30 In certain countries, this responsibility also rests with prosecution authorities.
**Recommendation 28**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 28.

**Essential criteria**

28.1 Competent authorities responsible for conducting investigations of ML, FT and other underlying predicate offences should have the powers to be able to:

   a) compel production of,
   b) search persons or premises for, and
   c) seize and obtain

transaction records, identification data obtained through the CDD process, account files and business correspondence, and other records, documents or information, held or maintained by financial institutions and other businesses or persons. Such powers should be exercised through lawful process (for example, subpoenas, summonses, search and seizure warrants, or court orders) and be available for use in investigations and prosecutions of ML, FT, and other underlying predicate offences, or in related actions e.g. actions to freeze and confiscate the proceeds of crime.

28.2 The competent authorities referred to above should have the powers to be able to take witnesses’ statements for use in investigations and prosecutions of ML, FT, and other underlying predicate offences, or in related actions.
**Recommendation 29**

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 29.

**Essential criteria**

29.1 Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by financial institutions\(^3\), with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, consistent with the FATF Recommendations.

29.2 Supervisors should have the authority to conduct inspections of financial institutions, including on-site inspections, to ensure compliance. Such inspections should include the review of policies, procedures, books and records, and should extend to sample testing.

29.3 Supervisors should have the power to compel production of or to obtain access to all records, documents or information relevant to monitoring compliance. This includes all documents or information related to accounts or other business relationships, or transactions, including any analysis the financial institution has made to detect unusual or suspicious transactions.

29.3.1 The supervisor’s power to compel production of or to obtain access for supervisory purposes should not be predicated on the need to require a court order.

29.4 The supervisor should have adequate powers of enforcement and sanction against financial institutions, and their directors or senior management for failure to comply with or properly implement requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, consistent with the FATF Recommendations.

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\(^3\) Note to assessors: With respect to foreign branches and subsidiaries, the requirement for financial institutions to ensure that their foreign branches and subsidiaries observe AML/CFT measures is to be assessed only against R.22. However, under R.29, supervisors should have adequate powers to establish that financial institutions require their foreign branches and majority owned subsidiaries to apply R.22 effectively.
**Recommendation 30**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 30.

**Essential criteria**

30.1 FIUs, law enforcement and prosecution agencies, supervisors and other competent authorities involved in combating money laundering and terrorist financing should be adequately structured, funded, staffed, and provided with sufficient technical and other resources to fully and effectively perform their functions. Adequate structuring includes the need for sufficient operational independence and autonomy to ensure freedom from undue influence or interference.\(^{32}\)

30.2 Staff of competent authorities should be required to maintain high professional standards, including standards concerning confidentiality, and should be of high integrity and be appropriately skilled.

30.3 Staff of competent authorities should be provided with adequate and relevant training for combating ML and FT.

Examples of issues to be covered under adequate and relevant training include: the scope of predicate offences, ML and FT typologies, techniques to investigate and prosecute these offences, techniques for tracing property that is the proceeds of crime or is to be used to finance terrorism, and ensuring that such property is seized, frozen and confiscated, and the techniques to be used by supervisors to ensure that financial institutions are complying with their obligations; the use of information technology and other resources relevant to the execution of their functions. Countries could also provide special training and/or certification for financial investigators for, *inter alia*, investigations of ML, FT, and the predicate offences.

**Additional elements**

30.4 Are special training or educational programmes provided for judges and courts concerning ML and FT offences, and the seizure, freezing and confiscation of property that is the proceeds of crime or is to be used to finance terrorism?

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\(^{32}\) If a country’s FIU does not comply with the requirement to have sufficient operational independence and autonomy (Criterion 26.6), the country should only be rated down in Recommendation 26.
Recommendation 31

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 31.

Essential criteria

31.1 Policy makers, the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors and other competent authorities should have effective mechanisms in place which enable them to co-operate, and where appropriate, co-ordinate domestically with each other concerning the development and implementation of policies and activities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Such mechanisms should normally address:

(a) operational co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination between authorities at the law enforcement/FIU level (including customs authorities where appropriate); and between the FIU, law enforcement and supervisors;
(b) policy co-operation and, where appropriate, co-ordination across all relevant competent authorities.

Additional elements

31.2 Are mechanisms in place for consultation between competent authorities, the financial sector and other sectors (including DNFBP) that are subject to AML/CFT laws, regulations, guidelines or other measures?
**Recommendation 32**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 32.

**Essential criteria**

32.1 Countries should review the effectiveness of their systems for combating money laundering and terrorist financing on a regular basis.

32.2 Competent authorities should maintain comprehensive statistics on matters relevant to the effectiveness and efficiency of systems for combating money laundering and terrorist financing. This should include keeping annual statistics on:

(a) suspicious transaction reports, and other reports where appropriate under domestic law, received and disseminated -
   - STR received by the FIU, including a breakdown of the type of financial institution, DNFBP, or other business or person making the STR;
   - Breakdown of STR analysed and disseminated;
   - Reports filed on: (i) domestic or foreign currency transactions above a certain threshold, (ii) cross border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, or (iii) international wire transfers.

(b) ML & FT investigations; prosecutions and convictions, and on property frozen; seized and confiscated -
   - ML and FT investigations, prosecutions, and convictions;
   - The number of cases and the amounts of property frozen, seized, and confiscated relating to (i) ML, (ii) FT, and (iii) criminal proceeds; and
   - Number of persons or entities and the amounts of property frozen pursuant to or under U.N. Resolutions relating to terrorist financing.

(c) Mutual legal assistance or other international requests for co-operation -
   - All mutual legal assistance and extradition requests (including requests relating to freezing, seizing and confiscation) that are made or received, relating to ML, the predicate offences and FT, including the nature of the request, whether it was granted or refused, and the time required to respond;
   - Other formal requests for assistance made or received by the FIU, including whether the request was granted or refused;
   - Spontaneous referrals made by the FIU to foreign authorities.

(d) Other action
   - On-site examinations conducted by supervisors relating to or including AML/CFT and any sanctions applied.
   - Formal requests for assistance made or received by supervisors relating to or including AML/CFT, including whether the request was granted or refused.

**Additional elements**

32.3 Do competent authorities maintain comprehensive statistics on:
a) STR resulting in investigation, prosecution, or convictions for ML, FT or an underlying predicate offence?

b) any criminal sanctions applied to persons convicted of ML and FT offences?

c) other formal requests for assistance made or received by law enforcement authorities relating to ML or FT, including whether the request was granted or refused?

d) the number of cases and the amounts of property frozen, seized, and confiscated relating to underlying predicate offences where applicable?
**Recommendation 33**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 33.

**Essential criteria**

33.1 Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal persons in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing by ensuring that their commercial, corporate and other laws require adequate transparency concerning the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons.

Examples of mechanisms that countries could use in seeking to ensure that there is adequate transparency may include:

1. A system of central registration (or up front disclosure system) where a national registry records the required ownership and control details for all companies and other legal persons registered in that country. The relevant information could be either publicly available or only available to competent authorities. Changes in ownership and control information would need to be kept up to date.

2. Requiring company service providers to obtain, verify and retain records of the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons.

3. Relying on the investigative and other powers of law enforcement, regulatory, supervisory, or other competent authorities in a jurisdiction to obtain or have access to the information.

These mechanisms are, to a large degree, complementary and countries may find it highly desirable and beneficial to use a combination of them.

To the extent that countries rely on the investigative powers of their competent authorities, these authorities should have sufficiently strong compulsory powers for the purpose of obtaining the relevant information.

Whatever mechanism is used it is essential that: (a) competent authorities are able to obtain or have access in a timely fashion to the beneficial ownership and control information, (b) the information is adequate, accurate and timely (see Criterion 33.2) and (c) competent authorities are able to share such information with other competent authorities domestically or internationally.

33.2 Competent authorities should be able to obtain or have access in a timely fashion to adequate, accurate and current information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal persons.

33.3 Countries that have legal persons able to issue bearer shares should take appropriate measures to ensure that they are not misused for money laundering, and that the principles set out in criteria 33.1 and 33.2 above apply equally to legal persons that use bearer shares. The measures to be taken may vary from country to country, but each country should be able to demonstrate the adequacy and effectiveness of the measures that are applied.

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33 Note to assessors: These examples are summaries of mechanisms set out in the OECD Report “Behind the Corporate Veil. Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes” 2001. An explanation of these mechanisms and their suitability is contained in the report itself.
Additional elements

33.4 Are measures in place to facilitate access by financial institutions to beneficial ownership and control information, so as to allow them to more easily verify the customer identification data?
Recommendation 34

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 34.

Essential criteria

34.1 Countries should take measures to prevent the unlawful use of legal arrangements in relation to money laundering and terrorist financing by ensuring that its commercial, trust and other laws require adequate transparency concerning the beneficial ownership and control of trusts and other legal arrangements.

Examples\textsuperscript{34} of mechanisms that countries could use in seeking to ensure that there is adequate transparency may include:

1. A system of central registration (or up front disclosure system) where a national registry records details on trusts (i.e. settlors, trustees, beneficiaries and protectors) and other legal arrangements registered in that country. The relevant information could be either publicly available or only available to competent authorities. Changes in ownership and control information would need to be kept up to date.

2. Requiring trust service providers to obtain, verify and retain records of the details of the trust or other similar legal arrangements.

3. Relying on the investigative and other powers of law enforcement, regulatory, supervisory, or other competent authorities in a jurisdiction to obtain or have access to the information.

These mechanisms are, to a large degree, complementary and countries may find it highly desirable and beneficial to use a combination of them.

To the extent that countries rely on the investigative powers of their competent authorities, these authorities should have sufficiently strong compulsory powers for the purpose of obtaining the relevant information.

Whatever mechanism is used it is essential that: (a) competent authorities are able to obtain or have access in a timely fashion to the beneficial ownership and control information, (b) the information is adequate, accurate and timely (see Criterion 34.2) and (c) competent authorities are able to share such information with other competent authorities domestically or internationally.

34.2 Competent authorities should be able to obtain or have access in a timely fashion to adequate, accurate and current information on the beneficial ownership and control of legal arrangements, and in particular the settlor, the trustee, and the beneficiaries of express trusts.

\textsuperscript{34} Note to assessors: These examples are summaries of mechanisms set out in the OECD Report “Behind the Corporate Veil. Using Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes” 2001. An explanation of these mechanisms and their suitability is contained in the report itself.
Additional elements

34.3 Are measures in place to facilitate access by financial institutions to beneficial ownership and control information, so as to allow them to more easily verify the customer identification data?
D. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

Recommendation 35

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 35 and Special Recommendation I, and the text of the Conventions referred to in Recommendation 3535 (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criterion 35.1 and Criterion I.1 (in SR.I) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

35.1 Countries should sign and ratify, or otherwise become a party to, and fully implement, the Vienna Convention, the Palermo Convention and the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (the Terrorist Financing Convention).36

Additional elements

35.2 Have other relevant international conventions such as the 1990 Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism been signed, ratified or fully implemented?

35 Assessors should be satisfied that all the articles relevant to ML and FT are fully implemented.
36 Assessors should be satisfied that the following relevant articles of the Vienna Convention (Articles 3-11, 15, 17 and 19), the Palermo Convention (Articles 5-7, 10-16, 18-20, 24-27, 29-31, & 34), and the Terrorist Financing Convention (Articles 2-18) are fully implemented.
**Recommendation 36**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 36 and Special Recommendation V. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 36.1 – 36.6 and Criterion V.1 (in SR.V) are consistent.)

**Essential criteria**

36.1 Countries should be able to provide the widest possible range of mutual legal assistance in AML/CFT investigations, prosecutions and related proceedings. Mutual legal assistance should include assistance of the following nature: (a) the production, search and seizure of information, documents, or evidence (including financial records) from financial institutions, or other natural or legal persons; (b) the taking of evidence or statements from persons; (c) providing originals or copies of relevant documents and records as well as any other information and evidentiary items; (d) effecting service of judicial documents; (e) facilitating the voluntary appearance of persons for the purpose of providing information or testimony to the requesting country and (f) identification, freezing, seizure, or confiscation of assets laundered or intended to be laundered, the proceeds of ML and assets used for or intended to be used for FT, as well as the instrumentalities of such offences, and assets of corresponding value.

36.1.1 Countries should be able to provide such assistance in a timely, constructive and effective manner.

36.2 Mutual legal assistance should not be prohibited or made subject to unreasonable, disproportionate or unduly restrictive conditions.

Possible examples of such conditions (for which an assessment as to reasonableness, proportionality or restrictiveness should be made) could include: generally refusing to provide assistance on the grounds that judicial proceedings have not commenced in the requesting country; requiring a conviction before providing assistance; overly strict interpretations of the principles of reciprocity and dual criminality.

36.3 There should be clear and efficient processes for the execution of mutual legal assistance requests in a timely way and without undue delays.

36.4 A request for mutual legal assistance should not be refused on the sole ground that the offence is also considered to involve fiscal matters.

36.5 A request for mutual legal assistance should not be refused on the grounds of laws that impose secrecy or confidentiality requirements on financial institutions or DNFBP, except where the relevant information was obtained in circumstances where legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy applies.

36.6 The powers of competent authorities required under R.28 should also be available for use in response to requests for mutual legal assistance.

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35 Note to assessors: Where the money laundering offence or the terrorist financing offence has deficiencies such as not covering all the required predicate offences, or not criminalising the financing of a terrorist organisation or individual terrorist, this may impact on the ability of the assessed country to provide international co-operation if dual criminality is a precondition for extradition or providing mutual legal assistance. This could be a factor affecting the rating.

36 Elements (a) to (f) are drawn from the Palermo Convention.

39 See also Criteria 16.2.
36.7 To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, countries should consider devising and applying mechanisms for determining the best venue for prosecution of defendants in the interests of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in more than one country.

Additional elements

36.8 Are the powers of competent authorities required under R.28 available for use when there is a direct request from foreign judicial or law enforcement authorities to domestic counterparts?
Recommendation 37

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 37 and Special Recommendation V. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criterion 37.1 and Criterion V.2 (in SR.V) are consistent.)

**Essential criteria**

37.1 To the greatest extent possible, mutual legal assistance should be rendered in the absence of dual criminality, in particular, for less intrusive and non compulsory measures.

37.2 For extradition and those forms of mutual legal assistance where dual criminality is required, the requested state (that is rendering the assistance) should have no legal or practical impediment to rendering assistance where both countries criminalise the conduct underlying the offence. Technical differences between the laws in the requesting and requested states, such as differences in the manner in which each country categorises or denominates the offence should not pose an impediment to the provision of mutual legal assistance.
**Recommendation 38**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 38 and its Interpretative Note, and the text of Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation V. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 38.1 – 38.3 and Criterion 36.1 & V.3 are consistent.)

**Essential criteria**

38.1 There should be appropriate laws and procedures to provide an effective and timely response to mutual legal assistance requests\(^{40}\) by foreign countries related to the identification, freezing, seizure, or confiscation of:

(a) laundered property from,
(b) proceeds from,
(c) instrumentalities used in, or
(d) instrumentalities intended for use in,

the commission of any ML, FT or other predicate offences.

38.2 The requirements in Criterion 38.1 should also be met where the request relates to property of corresponding value.

38.3 Countries should have arrangements for co-ordinating seizure and confiscation actions with other countries.

38.4 Countries should consider establishing an asset forfeiture fund into which all or a portion of confiscated property will be deposited and will be used for law enforcement, health, education or other appropriate purposes.

38.5 Countries should consider authorising the sharing of confiscated assets between them when confiscation is directly or indirectly a result of co-ordinated law enforcement actions.

**Additional elements**

38.6 Are foreign non criminal confiscation orders (as described in criterion 3.7) recognised and enforced?

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\(^{40}\) Note to assessors: note also R.36, footnote 37.
Recommendation 39

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 39.

Essential criteria

39.1 Money laundering should be an extraditable offence. There should be laws and procedures to extradite individuals charged with a money laundering offence.

39.2 Countries should either:
   a) extradite their own nationals or,
   b) where a country does not extradite its own nationals solely on the grounds of nationality, that country should, at the request of the country seeking extradition, submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution of the offences set forth in the request. In such cases, the competent authorities should take their decision and conduct their proceedings in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a serious nature under the domestic law of that country.

39.3 In the case referred to in criterion 39.2(b), countries should cooperate with each other, in particular on procedural and evidentiary aspects, to ensure the efficiency of the prosecution.

39.4 Consistent with the principles of domestic law, countries should adopt measures or procedures that will allow extradition requests and proceedings relating to ML to be handled without undue delay.

Additional elements

39.5 Are simplified procedures of extradition in place by allowing direct transmission of extradition requests between appropriate ministries? Can persons be extradited based only on warrants of arrests or judgements? Is there a simplified procedure of extradition of consenting persons who waive formal extradition proceedings in place?

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Note to assessors: note also R.36, footnote 37.
**Recommendation 40**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Recommendation 40 and its Interpretative Note, and Special Recommendation V. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria 40.1 – 40.9 and Criterion V.5 (in SR.V) are consistent.)

**Essential criteria**

40.1 Countries should ensure that their competent authorities are able to provide the widest range of international cooperation to their foreign counterparts.

40.1.1 Countries should be able to provide such assistance in a rapid, constructive and effective manner.

40.2 There should be clear and effective gateways, mechanisms or channels that will facilitate and allow for prompt and constructive exchanges of information directly between counterparts.

Examples of gateways, mechanisms or channels used in international cooperation and exchanges of information (other than MLA or extradition) include laws allowing exchanges of information on a reciprocal basis; bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements such as Memorandum of Understanding (MOU); and exchanges through appropriate international or regional organisations or bodies such as Interpol or the Egmont Group of FIUs.

40.3 Such exchanges of information should be possible: (a) both spontaneously and upon request, and (b) in relation to both money laundering and the underlying predicate offences.

40.4 Countries should ensure that all their competent authorities are authorised to conduct inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts.

40.4.1 In particular, countries should ensure that their FIU is authorised to make the following types of inquiries on behalf of foreign counterparts: (a) searching its own databases, including with respect to information related to suspicious transaction reports; (b) searching other databases to which it may have direct or indirect access, including law enforcement databases, public databases, administrative databases and commercially available databases.

40.5 Countries should ensure that their law enforcement authorities are authorised to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts; other competent authorities should be authorised to conduct investigations on behalf of foreign counterparts, where permitted by domestic law.

40.6 Exchanges of information should not be made subject to disproportionate or unduly restrictive conditions.

40.7 Requests for cooperation should not be refused on the sole ground that the request is also considered to involve fiscal matters.

40.8 Requests for cooperation should not be refused on the grounds of laws that impose secrecy or confidentiality requirements on financial institutions or DNFBP (except where the relevant

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42 Obstacles to a prompt and constructive exchange of information include failing to respond or take the appropriate measures in a timely way, and unreasonable delays in responding.
information that is sought is held in circumstances where legal professional privilege or legal professional secrecy applies\(^{43}\).

40.9 Countries should establish controls and safeguards to ensure that information received by competent authorities is used only in an authorised manner. These controls and safeguards should be consistent with national provisions on privacy and data protection\(^{44}\).

**Additional elements**

40.10 Are mechanisms in place to permit a prompt and constructive exchange of information with non-counterparts? Does it take place directly or indirectly\(^{45}\)?

40.10.1 Does the requesting authority as a matter of practice disclose to the requested authority the purpose of the request and on whose behalf the request is made?

40.11 Can the FIU obtain from other competent authorities or other persons relevant information requested by a foreign counterpart FIU?

\(^{43}\) See also criteria 16.2

\(^{44}\) This implies that, at a minimum, exchanged information must be treated as protected by the same confidentiality provisions as apply to similar information from domestic sources obtained by the receiving competent authority.

\(^{45}\) The reference to indirect exchange of information with foreign authorities other than counterparts covers the situation where the requested information passes from the foreign authority through one or more domestic or foreign authorities before being received by the requesting authority.
NINE SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS
Essential Criteria and Additional Elements

Special Recommendation I


Essential criteria

I.1 Countries should sign and ratify, or otherwise become a party to, and fully implement, the Terrorist Financing Convention.\(^{46}\)

I.2 Countries should fully implement the United Nations Security Council Resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of FT. These comprise S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions and S/RES/1373(2001). This requires any necessary laws, regulations or other measures to be in place and for these provisions to cover the requirements contained in those resolutions.

\(^{46}\) Assessors should be satisfied that all relevant articles of the Terrorist Financing Convention are fully implemented (Articles 2-6 and 17-18 which relate to SR.II; Article 8 which relates to SR.III; and Articles 7 and 9-18 which relate to SR.V.)
Special Recommendation II

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation II, Special Recommendation I, Recommendations 1 and 2, and the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention). (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria II.1 – II.3, Criterion I.1 (in SR.I) and Criteria 1.3 (in R.1) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

II.1 Terrorist financing should be criminalised consistent with Article 2 of the Terrorist Financing Convention, and should have the following characteristics:47

(a) Terrorist financing offences should extend to any person who wilfully provides or collects funds by any means, directly or indirectly, with the unlawful intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part:

(i) to carry out a terrorist act(s);
(ii) by a terrorist organisation; or
(iii) by an individual terrorist.

(b) Terrorist financing offences should extend to any funds as that term is defined in the TF Convention. This includes funds whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source.

The Terrorist Financing Convention defines funds as:

“assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, however, acquired, and legal documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, letters of credit.”

(c) Terrorist financing offences should not require that the funds: (i) were actually used to carry out or attempt a terrorist act(s); or (ii) be linked to a specific terrorist act(s).

(d) It should also be an offence to attempt to commit the offence of terrorist financing.

(e) It should also be an offence to engage in any of the types of conduct set out in Article 2(5) of the Terrorist Financing Convention.

II.2 Terrorist financing offences should be predicate offences for money laundering.

II.3 Terrorist financing offences should apply, regardless of whether the person alleged to have committed the offence(s) is in the same country or a different country from the one in which the terrorist(s)/terrorist organisation(s) is located or the terrorist act(s) occurred/will occur.

II.4 Countries should ensure that Criteria 2.2 to 2.5 (in R.2) also apply in relation to the offence of FT48.

47 Note to assessors: the criminalisation of terrorist financing solely on the basis of aiding and abetting, attempt, or conspiracy does not comply with SRII.

48 Note to assessors: See also Recommendation 2 and footnote 5 on effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.
Special Recommendation III


Essential criteria

Freezing and, where appropriate, seizing under the relevant U.N. Resolutions:

III.1 Countries should have effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated by the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee in accordance with S/RES/1267(1999). Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved.

III.2 A country should have effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated in the context of S/RES/1373(2001). Such freezing should take place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons involved.

S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions obligate countries to freeze without delay the funds or other assets owned or controlled by Al-Qaida, the Taliban, Usama bin Laden, or persons and entities associated with them as designated by the United Nations Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee established pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267(1999), including funds derived from funds or other assets owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by them or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction, and ensure that neither these nor any other funds or other assets are made available, directly or indirectly, for such persons’ benefit, by their nationals or by any person within their territory. The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee is the authority responsible for designating the persons and entities that should have their funds or other assets frozen under S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions. All countries that are members of the United Nations are obligated by S/RES/1267(1999) and its successor resolutions to freeze the assets of persons and entities so designated by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee.

S/RES/1373(2001) obligates countries to freeze without delay the funds or other assets of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds or other assets derived or generated from property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such persons and associated persons and entities. Each individual country has the authority to designate the persons and entities that should have their funds or other assets frozen. Additionally, to ensure that effective co-operation is developed among countries, countries should examine and give effect to, if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other countries. When (i) a specific notification or communication is sent and (ii) the country receiving the request is satisfied, according to applicable legal principles, that a requested designation is supported by reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that the proposed designee is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism or a terrorist organisation, the country receiving
the request must ensure that the funds or other assets of the designated person are frozen without delay.

III.3 A country should have effective laws and procedures to examine and give effect to, if appropriate, the actions initiated under the freezing mechanisms of other jurisdictions. Such procedures should ensure the prompt determination, according to applicable national legal principles, whether reasonable grounds or a reasonable basis exists to initiate a freezing action and the subsequent freezing of funds or other assets without delay.

III.4 The freezing actions referred to in Criteria III.1 – III.3 should extend to:

(a) funds or other assets wholly or jointly\(^49\) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by designated persons, terrorists, those who finance terrorism or terrorist organisations; and

(b) funds or other assets derived or generated from funds or other assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated persons, terrorists, those who finance terrorism or terrorist organisations.

III.5 Countries should have effective systems for communicating actions taken under the freezing mechanisms referred to in Criteria III.1 – III.3 to the financial sector\(^50\) immediately upon taking such action.

III.6 Countries should provide clear guidance to financial institutions and other persons or entities that may be holding targeted funds or other assets concerning their obligations in taking action under freezing mechanisms.

III.7 Countries should have effective and publicly-known procedures for considering de-listing requests and for unfreezing the funds or other assets of de-listed persons or entities in a timely manner consistent with international obligations.

III.8 Countries should have effective and publicly-known procedures for unfreezing, in a timely manner, the funds or other assets of persons or entities inadvertently affected by a freezing mechanism upon verification that the person or entity is not a designated person.

III.9 Countries should have appropriate procedures for authorising access to funds or other assets that were frozen pursuant to S/RES/1267(1999) and that have been determined to be necessary for basic expenses, the payment of certain types of fees, expenses and service charges or for extraordinary expenses. These procedures should be in accordance with S/RES/1452(2002).

III.10 Countries should have appropriate procedures through which a person or entity whose funds or other assets have been frozen can challenge that measure with a view to having it reviewed by a court.

Freezing, Seizing and Confiscation in other circumstances

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\(^{49}\) Jointly refers to those assets held jointly between or among designated persons, terrorists, those who finance terrorism or terrorist organisations on the one hand, and a third party or parties on the other hand.

\(^{50}\) For examples of possible mechanisms to communicate actions taken or to be taken to the financial sector and/or the general public, see the FATF Best Practices paper entitled “Freezing of Terrorist Assets – International Best Practices”.
III.11 Countries should ensure that Criteria 3.1 – 3.4 and Criterion 3.6 (in R.3) also apply in relation to the freezing, seizing and confiscation of terrorist-related funds or other assets in contexts other than those described in Criteria III.1 – III.10.

General provisions

III.12 Laws and other measures should provide protection for the rights of bona fide third parties. Such protection should be consistent with the standards provided in Article 8 of the Terrorist Financing Convention, where applicable.

III.13 Countries should have appropriate measures to monitor effectively the compliance with relevant legislation, rules or regulations governing the obligations under SR III and to impose civil, administrative or criminal sanctions for failure to comply with such legislation, rules or regulations.

Additional elements

III.14 Have the measures set out in the Best Practices Paper for SR.III been implemented?

III.15 Have the procedures to authorise access to funds or other assets that were frozen pursuant to S/RES/1373(2001) and that have been determined to be necessary for basic expenses, the payment of certain types of fees, expenses and service charges or for extraordinary expenses been implemented? Are these procedures consistent with S/RES/1373(2001) and the spirit of S/RES/1452(2003)?
Special Recommendation IV

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation IV, and Recommendations 13, 16 and 17. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criteria IV.1 – IV.2, Criteria 13.1 – 13.4 (in R.13), and Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 (in R.17) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

IV.1 A financial institution should be required by law or regulation to report to the FIU (a suspicious transaction report – STR) when it suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are linked or related to, or to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or by terrorist organisations or those who finance terrorism. This requirement should be a direct mandatory obligation, and any indirect or implicit obligation to report suspicious transactions, whether by reason of possible prosecution for a FT offence or otherwise (so called “indirect reporting”), is not acceptable.

IV.2 Countries should ensure that Criteria 13.3 – 13.4 (in R.13) also apply in relation to the obligations under SR IV.

51 Systems based on the reporting of unusual transactions (rather than suspicious transactions) are equally satisfactory.
Special Recommendation V

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation V, Special Recommendation I, Recommendations 36-40, the 1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorist Financing Convention), and Special Recommendation III.

Essential criteria

V.1 Countries should ensure that Criteria 36.1 – 36.6 (in R.36) also apply to the obligations under SR.V\(^\text{52}\).

V.2 Countries should ensure that Criteria 37.1-37.2 (in R.37) also apply to the obligations under SR.V.

V.3 Countries should ensure that Criteria 38.1 – 38.3 (in R.38) also apply to the obligations under SR.V.

V.4 Countries should ensure that Criteria 39.1 – 39.4 (in R.39) also apply to extradition proceedings related to terrorist acts and FT.

V.5 Countries should ensure that Criteria 40.1 – 40.9 (in R.40) also apply to the obligations under SR.V.

Additional elements

V.6 Do additional elements 36.7 – 36.8 (in R.36) apply in relation to the obligations under SR.V?

V.7 Do additional elements 38.4 – 38.6 (in R.38) apply in relation to the obligations under SR.V?

V.8 Does the additional element 39.5 (in R.39) apply extradition proceedings related to terrorist acts or FT?

V.9 Do additional elements 40.10 – 40.11 (in R.40) apply in relation to the obligations under SR.V?

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\(^{52}\) Note to assessors: note also R.36, footnote 37.
Special Recommendation VI

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation VI, its Interpretative Note and its Best Practices Paper, Special Recommendation VII and its Interpretative Note, and Recommendation 17. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criterion VI.5 and Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 (in R.17) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

VI.1 Countries should designate one or more competent authorities to register and/or licence natural and legal persons that perform money or value transfer services (MVT service operators), maintain a current list of the names and addresses of licensed and/or registered MVT service operators, and be responsible for ensuring compliance with licensing and/or registration requirements.\(^{53}\)

VI.2 Countries should ensure that all MVT service operators are subject to the applicable FATF Forty Recommendations (in particular Recommendations 4-11, 13-15 and 21-23) and FATF Nine Special Recommendations (in particular SR.VII)\(^{54}\).

VI.3 Countries should have systems in place for monitoring MVT service operators and ensuring that they comply with the FATF Recommendations.

VI.4 Countries should require each licensed or registered MVT service operator to maintain a current list of its agents which must be made available to the designated competent authority.

VI.5 Countries should ensure that Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 (in R.17) also apply in relation to the obligations under SR VI.

Additional elements

VI.6 Have the measures set out in the Best Practices Paper for SR.VI been implemented?

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\(^{53}\) SR.VI does not require countries to establish a separate licensing/registration system or designate another competent authority in respect of money remitters which are already licensed/registered as financial institutions within the country, permitted to perform MVT services under the terms of their license/registration, and already subject to the full range of applicable obligations under the FATF Forty Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations.

\(^{54}\) Note to assessors: where there are deficiencies in the laws, regulations or other measures that are required to be applied to money value transfer service operators under other relevant Recommendations (such as those on customer due diligence, record keeping, reporting of suspicious transactions, or wire transfers), such deficiencies should also be noted in SR VI, and be taken into account in the assessment of the rating for SRVI.
Special Recommendation VII

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of SR.VII and its Interpretative Note, Recommendation 5 as it relates to verification of a customer’s identity (see Essential Criterion 5.3) and Recommendation 17. (Note to assessors: Ensure that the assessments of Criterion VII.1, VII.9, Criterion 5.3 (in R.5) and Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 (in R.17) are consistent.)

Essential criteria

SR VII applies to cross-border and domestic transfers between financial institutions. However, SR VII is not intended to cover the following types of payments:

a. Any transfer that flows from a transaction carried out using a credit or debit card so long as the credit or debit card number accompanies all transfers flowing from the transaction, such as withdrawals from a bank account through an ATM machine, cash advances from a credit card, or payments for goods and services. However, when credit or debit cards are used as a payment system to effect a money transfer, they are covered by SR VII, and the necessary information should be included in the message.

b. Financial institution-to-financial institution transfers and settlements where both the originator person and the beneficiary person are financial institutions acting on their own behalf.

VII.1 For all wire transfers, of EUR/USD 1 000 or more, ordering financial institutions should be required to obtain and maintain the following information relating to the originator of the wire transfer:

- the name of the originator;
- the originator’s account number (or a unique reference number if no account number exists); and
- the originator’s address (countries may permit financial institutions to substitute the address with a national identity number, customer identification number, or date and place of birth).

(This set of information is referred to as full originator information.)

For all wire transfers of EUR/USD 1 000 or more, ordering financial institutions should be required to verify the identity of the originator in accordance with Recommendation 5.

VII.2 For cross-border wire transfers of EUR/USD 1 000 or more the ordering financial institution should be required to include full originator information in the message or payment form accompanying the wire transfer.

However, if several individual cross-border wire transfers (of EUR/USD 1 000 or more) from a single originator are bundled in a batch file for transmission to beneficiaries in another country, the ordering financial institution only needs to include the originator’s account number or unique identifier on each individual cross-border wire transfer, provided that the batch file (in 55 Financial institutions do not have to repeatedly obtain originator information and verify originator identity every time a customer makes a wire transfer. Financial institutions could rely on the information already available if, as part of the customer due diligence process, they have obtained:

(i) the originator’s name;
(ii) account number (or unique reference number if no account number exists); and
(iii) address (or national identity number, customer identification number, or date and place of birth if the country permits one of these pieces of information to substitute for the address)
and verified the originator’s identity in accordance with Recommendation 5 (see, in particular, criterion 5.3). This does not apply to occasional customers.)
which the individual transfers are batched) contains full originator information that is fully traceable within the recipient country.

VII.3 For domestic wire transfers the ordering financial institution should be required to either: (a) comply with Criterion VII.2 above or (b) include only the originator's account number or a unique identifier, within the message or payment form. The second option should be permitted only if full originator information can be made available to the beneficiary financial institution and to appropriate authorities within three business days of receiving a request, and domestic law enforcement authorities can compel immediate production of it.

VII.4 Each intermediary and beneficiary financial institution in the payment chain should be required to ensure that all originator information that accompanies a wire transfer is transmitted with the transfer.

VII.4.1. Where technical limitations prevent the full originator information accompanying a cross-border wire transfer from being transmitted with a related domestic wire transfer (during the necessary time to adapt payment systems), a record must be kept for five years by the receiving intermediary financial institution of all the information received from the ordering financial institution.

VII.5 Beneficiary financial institutions should be required to adopt effective risk-based procedures for identifying and handling wire transfers that are not accompanied by complete originator information. The lack of complete originator information may be considered as a factor in assessing whether a wire transfer or related transactions are suspicious and, as appropriate, whether they are thus required to be reported to the financial intelligence unit or other competent authorities. In some cases, the beneficiary financial institution should consider restricting or even terminating its business relationship with financial institutions that fail to meet SR.VII standards.

VII.6 Countries should have measures in place to effectively monitor the compliance of financial institutions with rules and regulations implementing SR.VII.

VII.7 Countries should ensure that Criteria 17.1 – 17.4 (in R.17) also apply in relation to the obligations under SR.VII.

Additional elements

VII.8 Countries may require that all incoming cross-border wire transfers (including those below EUR/USD 1 000) contain full and accurate originator information.

VII.9 Countries may require that all outgoing cross-border wire transfers below EUR/USD 1 000 contain full and accurate originator information.
**Special Recommendation VIII**

The essential criteria and additional elements listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation VIII, its Interpretative Note and its Best Practices Paper.

**Essential criteria**

*Reviews of the domestic non-profit sector:*

VIII.1 Countries should: (i) review the adequacy of domestic laws and regulations that relate to non-profit organisations; (ii) use all available sources of information to undertake domestic reviews of or have the capacity to obtain timely information on the activities, size and other relevant features of their non-profit sectors for the purpose of identifying the features and types of non-profit organisations (NPOs) that are at risk of being misused for terrorist financing by virtue of their activities or characteristics; and (iii) conduct periodic reassessments by reviewing new information on the sector’s potential vulnerabilities to terrorist activities.

Some examples of possible sources of information that could be used to undertake a domestic review or provide timely information on the activities, size and other relevant features of the domestic non-profit sector are: regulators, statistical institutions, tax authorities, FIUs, donor organisations, self-regulatory organizations or accreditation institutions, or law enforcement and intelligence authorities.

*Protecting the NPO sector from terrorist financing through outreach and effective oversight:*

VIII.2 Countries should undertake outreach to the NPO sector with a view to protecting the sector from terrorist financing abuse. This outreach should include (i) raising awareness in the NPO sector about the risks of terrorist abuse and the available measures to protect against such abuse; and (ii) promoting transparency, accountability, integrity, and public confidence in the administration and management of all NPOs.

An effective outreach program with the NPO sector may include the development of best practices to address terrorist financing risks, regular outreach events with the sector to discuss scope and methods of abuse of NPOs, emerging trends in terrorist financing and new protective measures, and the issuance of advisory papers and other useful resources.

VIII.3 Countries should be able to demonstrate that the following steps have been taken to promote effective supervision or monitoring of those NPOs which account for: (i) a significant portion of the financial resources under control of the sector; and (ii) a substantial share of the sector’s international activities.

VIII.3.1 NPOs should maintain information on: (1) the purpose and objectives of their stated activities; and (2) the identity of person(s) who own, control or direct their activities, including senior officers, board members and trustees. This information should be publicly available either directly from the NPO or through appropriate authorities.

VIII.3.2 Countries should be able to demonstrate that there are appropriate measures in place to sanction violations of oversight measures or rules by NPOs or persons acting on behalf of NPOs. The application of such sanctions should not preclude parallel civil, administrative, or criminal proceedings with respect to NPOs or persons acting on their behalf where appropriate.

Sanctions may include freezing of accounts, removal of trustees, fines, de-certification, de-licensing or de-registration.
VIII.3.3 NPOs should be licensed or registered. This information should be available to competent authorities.\(^{56}\)

VIII.3.4 NPOs should maintain, for a period of at least five years, and make available to appropriate authorities, records of domestic and international transactions that are sufficiently detailed to verify that funds have been spent in a manner consistent with the purpose and objectives of the organisation. This also applies to information mentioned in paragraphs (i) and (ii) of the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VIII.

Targeting and attacking terrorist abuse of NPOs through effective information gathering, investigation:

VIII.4 Countries should implement measures to ensure that they can effectively investigate and gather information on NPOs.

VIII.4.1 Countries should ensure effective domestic co-operation, co-ordination and information sharing to the extent possible among all levels of appropriate authorities or organisations that hold relevant information on NPOs of potential terrorist financing concern.

VIII.4.2 Countries should ensure that full access to information on the administration and management of a particular NPO (including financial and programmatic information) may be obtained during the course of an investigation.

VIII.4.3 Countries should develop and implement mechanisms for the prompt sharing of information among all relevant competent authorities in order to take preventative or investigative action when there is suspicion or reasonable grounds to suspect that a particular NPO is being exploited for terrorist financing purposes or is a front organization for terrorist fundraising. Countries should have investigative expertise and capability to examine those NPOs that are suspected of either being exploited by or actively supporting terrorist activity or terrorist organisations. Countries should also have mechanisms in place that allow for prompt investigative or preventative action against such NPOs.

Responding to international requests for information about an NPO of concern:

VIII.5 Countries should identify appropriate points of contact and procedures to respond to international requests for information regarding particular NPOs that are suspected of terrorist financing or other forms of terrorist support.

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\(^{56}\) Specific licensing or registration requirements for counter terrorist financing purposes are not necessary. For example, in some countries, NPOs are already registered with tax authorities and monitored in the context of qualifying for favourable tax treatment (such as tax credits or tax exemptions).
Special Recommendation IX

The essential criteria listed below should be read in conjunction with the text of Special Recommendation IX and its Interpretative Note.

Essential criteria

IX.1 To detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments that are related to money laundering or terrorist financing, a country should implement one of the following two systems for incoming and outgoing cross-border transportations of currency or bearer negotiable instruments:

(a) A declaration system that has the following characteristics:
   (i) All persons making a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are of a value exceeding a prescribed threshold should be required to submit a truthful declaration to the designated competent authorities; and
   (ii) The prescribed threshold cannot exceed EUR/USD 15,000.

OR

(b) A disclosure system that has the following characteristics:
   (i) All persons making a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments should be required to make a truthful disclosure to the designated competent authorities upon request; and
   (ii) The designated competent authorities should have the authority to make their inquiries on a targeted basis, based on intelligence or suspicion, or on a random basis.

IX.2 Upon discovery of a false declaration/disclosure of currency or bearer negotiable instruments or a failure to declare/disclose them, designated competent authorities should have the authority to request and obtain further information from the carrier with regard to the origin of the currency or bearer negotiable instruments and their intended use.

IX.3 The designated competent authorities should be able to stop or restrain currency or bearer negotiable instruments for a reasonable time in order to ascertain whether evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing may be found:

(a) Where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or
(b) Where there is a false declaration/disclosure.

IX.4 At a minimum, information on the amount of currency or bearer negotiable instruments declared/disclosed or otherwise detected, and the identification data of the bearer(s) shall be retained for use by the appropriate authorities in instances when:

(a) A declaration which exceeds the prescribed threshold is made; or
(b) Where there is a false declaration/disclosure; or

57 Countries can use one or both systems for incoming and outgoing cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments.

58 Countries should implement Special Recommendation IX without restricting either: (i) trade payments between countries for goods and services; or (ii) the freedom of capital movements in any way.

59 Countries that implement a declaration system should ensure that the prescribed threshold is sufficiently low to meet the objectives of Special Recommendation IX. In any event, the threshold cannot exceed EUR/USD 15,000.
(c) Where there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing.

IX.5 Information obtained through the processes implemented in Criterion IX.1 should be available to the financial intelligence unit (FIU) either through:
(a) A system whereby the FIU is notified about suspicious cross-border transportation incidents; or
(b) By making the declaration/disclosure information directly available to the FIU in some other way.

IX.6 At the domestic level, there should be adequate co-ordination among customs, immigration and other related authorities on issues related to the implementation of Special Recommendation IX.

IX.7 At the international level, countries should allow for the greatest possible measure of co-operation and assistance amongst competent authorities, consistent with the obligations under Recommendations 35 to 40 and Special Recommendation V.

Examples of possible measures (drawn from the Best Practices Paper to Special Recommendation IX) include:

- Having co-operation arrangements with other countries which would allow for bilateral customs-to-customs information exchanges between customs and other relevant agencies on cross-border transportation reports and cash seizures.
- Ensuring that the information recorded pursuant to criterion IX.4 can be shared internationally with foreign competent authorities in appropriate cases.

IX.8 Countries should ensure that Criteria 17.1 to 17.4 (in R.17) also apply to persons who make a false declaration or disclosure contrary to the obligations under SR IX.

IX.9 Countries should ensure that Criteria 17.1 to 17.4 (in R.17) also apply to persons who are carrying out a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are related to terrorist financing or money laundering contrary to the obligations under SR IX.

IX.10 Countries should ensure that Criteria 3.1 to 3.6 (in R.3) also apply in relation to persons who are carrying out a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are related to terrorist financing or money laundering.

IX.11 Countries should ensure that Criteria III.1 to III.10 (in SR.III) also apply in relation to persons who are carrying out a physical cross-border transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are related to terrorist financing.

IX.12 If a country discovers an unusual cross-border movement of gold, precious metals or precious stones, it should consider notifying, as appropriate, the Customs Service or other competent authorities of the countries from which these items originated and/or to which they are destined, and should co-operate with a view toward establishing the source, destination, and purpose of the movement of such items and toward the taking of appropriate action.

IX.13 The systems for reporting cross border transactions should be subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of the information or data that is reported or recorded.

Additional elements

IX.14 Has the country implemented or considered implementing the measures set out in the Best Practices Paper for SR.IX?
IX.15 Where systems for reporting the cross border transportation of currency are in place, are the reports maintained in a computerised database, available to competent authorities for AML/CFT purposes?
# Annex 1

## Glossary of Definitions Used in the Methodology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accounts</td>
<td>References to “accounts” should be read as including other similar business relationships between financial institutions and their customers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation VI, an agent is any person who provides money or value transfer service under the direction of or by contract with a legally registered or licensed remitter (for example, licensees, franchisees, concessionaires). (This definition is drawn from the Interpretative Note to SR.VI. It is used in the criteria under SR.VI.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriate authorities</td>
<td>The term appropriate authorities refers to competent authorities, self-regulatory bodies, accrediting institutions and other administrative authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associate NPOs</td>
<td>The term associate NPOs includes foreign branches of international NPOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batch transfer</td>
<td>A batch transfer is a transfer comprised of a number of individual wire transfers that are being sent to the same financial institutions, but may/may not be ultimately intended for different persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearer negotiable instruments</td>
<td>Bearer negotiable instruments includes monetary instruments in bearer form such as: travellers cheques; negotiable instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders) that are either in bearer form, endorsed without restriction, made out to a fictitious payee, or otherwise in such form that title thereto passes upon delivery; incomplete instruments (including cheques, promissory notes and money orders) signed, but with the payee’s name omitted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearer shares</td>
<td>Bearer shares refers to negotiable instruments that accord ownership in a corporation to the person who possesses the bearer share certificate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial owner</td>
<td>Beneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiary</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation VIII, the term beneficiaries refers to those natural persons, or groups of natural persons who receive charitable, humanitarian or other types of assistance through the services of the NPO.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For the purposes of the other FATF Recommendations, the term beneficiary is as follows. All trusts (other than charitable or statutory permitted non-charitable trusts) must have beneficiaries, who may include the settlor, and a maximum time, known as the perpetuity period, normally of 100 years. While trusts must always have some ultimately ascertainable beneficiary, trusts may have no defined existing beneficiaries but only objects of a power until some person becomes entitled as beneficiary to income or capital on the expiry of a defined period, known as the accumulation period. This period is normally co-extensive with the trust perpetuity period which is usually referred to in the trust deed as the trust period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competent authorities</td>
<td>Competent authorities refers to all administrative and law enforcement authorities concerned with combating money laundering and terrorist financing, including the FIU and supervisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confiscation</td>
<td>The term confiscation, which includes forfeiture where applicable, means the permanent deprivation of funds or other assets by order of a competent authority or a court. Confiscation or forfeiture takes place through a judicial or administrative procedure that transfers the ownership of specified funds or other assets to be transferred to the State. In this case, the person(s) or entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the confiscation or forfeiture loses all rights, in principle, to the confiscated or forfeited funds or other assets. (Confiscation or forfeiture orders are usually linked to a criminal conviction or a court decision whereby the confiscated or forfeited property is determined to have been derived from or intended for use in a violation of the law.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consider</td>
<td>References in the Recommendations that require a country to consider taking particular measures means that the country should have made a proper consideration or assessment of whether to implement such measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Principles</td>
<td>Core Principles refers to the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Objectives and Principles for Securities Regulation issued by the International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the Insurance Supervisory Principles issued by the International Association of Insurance Supervisors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondent banking</td>
<td>Correspondent banking is the provision of banking services by one bank (the “correspondent bank”) to another bank (the “respondent bank”). Large international banks typically act as correspondents for thousands of other banks around the world. Respondent banks may be provided with a wide range of services, including cash management (e.g. interest-bearing accounts in a variety of currencies), international wire transfers of funds, cheque clearing, payable-through accounts and foreign exchange services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>All references in the FATF Recommendations and in this Methodology to country or countries apply equally to territories or jurisdictions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border transfer</td>
<td>Cross-border transfer means any wire transfer where the originator and beneficiary institutions are located in different jurisdictions. This term also refers to any chain of wire transfers that has at least one cross-border element.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Currency refers to banknotes and coins that are in circulation as a medium of exchange.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Designated categories of offences         | Designated categories of offences means:  
  - participation in an organised criminal group and racketeering;  
  - terrorism, including terrorist financing;  
  - trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling;  
  - sexual exploitation, including sexual exploitation of children;  
  - illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances;  
  - illicit arms trafficking; |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• illicit trafficking in stolen and other goods;</td>
<td>• corruption and bribery;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• fraud;</td>
<td>• counterfeiting currency;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• counterfeiting currency;</td>
<td>• counterfeiting and piracy of products;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• environmental crime;</td>
<td>• murder, grievous bodily injury;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking;</td>
<td>• robbery or theft;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• robbery or theft;</td>
<td>• smuggling;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• extortion;</td>
<td>• forgery;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• piracy;</td>
<td>• insider trading and market manipulation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When deciding on the range of offences to be covered as predicate offences under each of the categories listed above, each country may decide, in accordance with its domestic law, how it will define those offences and the nature of any particular elements of those offences that make them serious offences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Designated non-financial businesses and professions</td>
<td>Designated non-financial businesses and professions means:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Casinos (which also includes internet casinos).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Real estate agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Dealers in precious metals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d) Dealers in precious stones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>e) Lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals and accountants – this refers to sole practitioners, partners or employed professionals within professional firms. It is not meant to refer to ‘internal’ professionals that are employees of other types of businesses, nor to professionals working for government agencies, who may already be subject to measures that would combat money laundering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>f) Trust and Company Service Providers refers to all persons or businesses that are not covered elsewhere under these Recommendations, and which as a business, provide any of the following services to third parties:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• acting as a formation agent of legal persons;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a director or secretary of a company, a partner of a partnership, or a similar position in relation to other legal persons;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• providing a registered office; business address or accommodation, correspondence or administrative address for a company, a partnership or any other legal person or arrangement;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a trustee of an express trust;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• acting as (or arranging for another person to act as) a nominee shareholder for another person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated person</td>
<td>The term designated persons refers to those persons or entities designated by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee pursuant to S/RES/1267(1999) or those persons or entities designated and accepted, as appropriate, by jurisdictions pursuant to S/RES/1373(2001).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Designated threshold</td>
<td>Designated threshold refers to the amount set out in the Interpretative Notes to the Forty Recommendations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic transfer</td>
<td>Domestic transfer means any wire transfer where the originator and beneficiary institutions are located in the same jurisdiction. This term therefore refers to any chain of wire transfers that takes place entirely within the borders of a single jurisdiction, even though the system used to effect the wire transfer may be located in another jurisdiction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express trust</td>
<td><em>Express trust</em> refers to a trust clearly created by the settlor, usually in the form of a document e.g. a written deed of trust. They are to be contrasted with trusts which come into being through the operation of the law and which do not result from the clear intent or decision of a settlor to create a trust or similar legal arrangements (e.g. constructive trust).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False declaration</td>
<td><em>False declaration</em> refers to a misrepresentation of the value of currency or bearer negotiable instruments being transported, or a misrepresentation of other relevant data which is asked for in the declaration or otherwise requested by the authorities. This includes failing to make a declaration as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False disclosure</td>
<td><em>False disclosure</em> refers to a misrepresentation of the value of currency or bearer negotiable instruments being transported, or a misrepresentation of other relevant data which is asked for in the disclosure or otherwise requested by the authorities. This includes failing to make a disclosure as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATF Recommendations</td>
<td><em>The FATF Recommendations</em> refers to the Forty Recommendations and to the Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial institutions</td>
<td><em>Financial institutions</em> means any person or entity who conducts as a business one or more of the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Lending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Financial leasing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. The transfer of money or value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller's cheques, money orders and bankers' drafts, electronic money).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Financial guarantees and commitments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Trading in: (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, CDs, derivatives etc.); (b) foreign exchange; (c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments; (d) transferable securities; (e) commodity futures trading.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Participation in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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60 For the purposes of Special Recommendation VII, it is important to note that the term *financial institution* does not apply to any persons or entities that provide financial institutions solely with message or other support systems for transmitting funds.
61 This also captures private banking.
62 This includes inter alia: consumer credit; mortgage credit; factoring, with or without recourse; and finance of commercial transactions (including forfeiting).
63 This does not extend to financial leasing arrangements in relation to consumer products.
64 This applies to financial activity in both the formal or informal sector e.g. alternative remittance activity. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI. It does not apply to any natural or legal person that provides financial institutions solely with message or other support systems for transmitting funds. See the Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VII.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10. Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other investment related insurance(^{65}).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional or very limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such that there is little risk of money laundering activity occurring, a country may decide that the application of anti-money laundering measures is not necessary, either fully or partially.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk of money laundering, a country may decide not to apply some or all of the Forty Recommendations to some of the financial activities stated above.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{65}\) This applies both to insurance undertakings and to insurance intermediaries (agents and brokers).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>evidencing title to, or interest in, such funds or other assets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers cheques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds, drafts, or letters of credit, and any interest, dividends or other income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds or other assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds transfer</td>
<td>The terms <em>funds transfer</em> refers to any transaction carried out on behalf of an originator person (both natural and legal) through a financial institution by electronic means with a view to making an amount of money available to a beneficiary person at another financial institution. The originator and the beneficiary may be the same person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification data</td>
<td>Reliable, independent source documents, data or information will be referred to as “identification data”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediaries</td>
<td><em>Intermediaries</em> can be financial institutions, DNFBP or other reliable persons or businesses that meet Criteria 9.1 to 9.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations, prosecutions and related</td>
<td><em>Investigations, prosecutions and related proceedings</em> may be of a criminal, civil enforcement or administrative nature, and includes proceedings in relation to confiscation or provisional measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>related proceedings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law or regulation</td>
<td><em>Law or regulation</em> refers to primary and secondary legislation, such as laws, decrees, implementing regulations or other similar requirements, issued or authorised by a legislative body, and which impose mandatory requirements with sanctions for non-compliance. The sanctions for non-compliance should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal arrangements</td>
<td><em>Legal arrangements</em> refers to express trusts or other similar legal arrangements. Examples of other similar arrangements (for AML/CFT purposes) include fiducie, treuhand and fideicomiso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal persons</td>
<td><em>Legal persons</em> refers to bodies corporate, foundations, anstalt, partnerships, or associations, or any similar bodies that can establish a permanent customer relationship with a financial institution or otherwise own property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licensing</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation VI only, <em>licensing</em> means a requirement to obtain permission from a designated competent authority in order to operate a money/value transfer service legally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money laundering (ML) offence</td>
<td>References in this Methodology (except in R.1) to a <em>money laundering (ML) offence</em> refer not only to the primary offence or offences, but also to ancillary offences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money or value transfer service</td>
<td><em>Money or value transfer service</em> refers to a financial service that accepts cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value in one location and pays a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary in another location by means of a communication, message, transfer or through a clearing network to which the money/value transfer service belongs. Transactions performed by such services can involve one or more intermediaries and a third party final payment. A money or value transfer service may be provided by persons (natural or legal) formally through the regulated financial system or informally through non-bank financial institutions or other business entities or any other mechanism either</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>through the regulated financial system (for example, use of bank accounts) or through a network or mechanism that operates outside the regulated system. In some jurisdictions, informal systems are frequently referred to as alternative remittance services or underground (or parallel) banking systems. Often these systems have ties to particular geographic regions and are therefore described using a variety of specific terms. Some examples of these terms include hawala, hundi, fei-chien, and the black market peso exchange. (This definition is drawn from the Interpretative Note to SR.VI. It is used in the criteria under SR.VI.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-profit organisations</td>
<td>The term non-profit organisation or NPO refers to a legal entity or organisation that primarily engages in raising or disbursing funds for purposes such as charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of “good works”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Originator</td>
<td>The originator is the account holder, or where there is no account, the person (natural or legal) that places the order with the financial institution to perform the wire transfer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other enforceable means</td>
<td>Other enforceable means refers to guidelines, instructions or other documents or mechanisms that set out enforceable requirements with sanctions for non-compliance, and which are issued by a competent authority (e.g. a financial supervisory authority) or an SRO. The sanctions for non-compliance should be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payable-through accounts</td>
<td>Payable-through accounts refers to correspondent accounts that are used directly by third parties to transact business on their own behalf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical cross-border transportation</td>
<td>Physical cross-border transportation refers to any in-bound or out-bound physical transportation of currency or bearer negotiable instruments from one country to another country. The term includes the following modes of transportation: (1) physical transportation by a natural person, or in that person’s accompanying luggage or vehicle; (2) shipment of currency through containerised cargo or (3) the mailing of currency or bearer negotiable instruments by a natural or legal person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Exposed Persons” (PEPs)</td>
<td>PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted with prominent public functions in a foreign country, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials. Business relationships with family members or close associates of PEPs involve reputational risks similar to those with PEPs themselves. The definition is not intended to cover middle ranking or more junior individuals in the foregoing categories.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proceeds</td>
<td>Proceeds refers to any property derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>Property means assets of every kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, moveable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in such assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation VI, registration means a requirement to register with or declare to a designated competent authority the existence of a money/value transfer service in order for the business to operate legally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related to terrorist financing or money laundering</td>
<td>When used to describe currency or bearer negotiable instruments, the term Related to terrorist financing or money laundering refers to currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are: (i) the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations; or (ii) laundered, proceeds from money laundering or predicate offences, or instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of these offences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>All references to risk in this Methodology refer to the risk of money laundering and/or terrorist financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>Where reference is made to a financial institution being satisfied as to a matter, that institution must be able to justify its assessment to competent authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>The term seize means to prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or movement of funds or other assets on the basis of an action initiated by a competent authority or a court under a freezing mechanism. However, unlike a freezing action, a seizure is effected by a mechanism that allows the competent authority or court to take control of specified funds or other assets. The seized funds or other assets remain the property of the person(s) or entity(ies) that held an interest in the specified funds or other assets at the time of the seizure, although the competent authority or court will often take over possession, administration or management of the seized funds or other assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-regulatory organisation (SRO)</td>
<td>A SRO is a body that represents a profession (e.g. lawyers, notaries, other independent legal professionals or accountants), and which is made up of member professionals, has a role in regulating the persons that are qualified to enter and who practise in the profession, and also performs certain supervisory or monitoring type functions. For example, it would be normal for this body to enforce rules to ensure that high ethical and moral standards are maintained by those practising the profession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Settlor</td>
<td>Settlers are persons or companies who transfer ownership of their assets to trustees by means of a trust deed. Where the trustees have some discretion as to the investment and distribution of the trusts assets, the deed may be accompanied by a non-legally binding letter setting out what the settlor wishes to be done with the assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell bank</td>
<td>Shell bank means a bank that has no physical presence in the country in which it is incorporated and licensed, and which is unaffiliated with a regulated financial services group that is subject to effective consolidated supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical presence means meaningful mind and management located within a country. The existence simply of a local agent or low level staff does not constitute physical presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should</td>
<td>For the purposes of assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations, the word should has the same meaning as must.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR</td>
<td>STR refers to suspicious transaction reports.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidiaries</td>
<td>Subsidiaries refers to majority owned subsidiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors</td>
<td>Supervisors refers to the designated competent authorities responsible for ensuring compliance by financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist</td>
<td>For purposes of SRIII, the term terrorist is as defined in the Interpretative Note of SRIII. Otherwise, it refers to any natural person who: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist act</td>
<td>A terrorist act includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(ii) any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Terrorist financing       | Terrorist financing (FT) includes the financing of terrorist acts, and of terrorists
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(FT)</td>
<td>and terrorist organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist financing offence</td>
<td>References in this Methodology (except in SR II) to a terrorist financing (FT) offence refer not only to the primary offence or offences, but also to ancillary offences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist organisation</td>
<td>For purposes of SRIII, the term terrorist organisation is as defined in the Interpretative Note of SRIII. Otherwise, it refers to any group of terrorists that: (i) commits, or attempts to commit, terrorist acts by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully; (ii) participates as an accomplice in terrorist acts; (iii) organises or directs others to commit terrorist acts; or (iv) contributes to the commission of terrorist acts by a group of persons acting with a common purpose where the contribution is made intentionally and with the aim of furthering the terrorist act or with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit a terrorist act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third parties</td>
<td>For the purposes of R.9 only, third parties means financial institutions or DNFBP that are supervised and that meet Criteria 9.1 to 9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who finance terrorism</td>
<td>For the purposes of SR III only, the phrase those who finance terrorism refers to any person, group, undertaking or other entity that provides or collects, by any means, directly or indirectly, funds or other assets that may be used, in full or in part, to facilitate the commission of terrorist acts, or to any persons or entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons, groups, undertakings or other entities. This includes those who provide or collect funds or other assets with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out terrorist acts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transactions</td>
<td>In the insurance sector, the word transactions should be understood to refer to the insurance product itself, the premium payment and the benefits. For specific requirements with regard to record keeping of transactions in the insurance sector, see the IAIS Guidance Notes of January 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trustee</td>
<td>Trustees, who may be paid professionals or companies or unpaid persons, hold the assets in a trust fund separate from their own assets. They invest and dispose of them in accordance with the settlor’s trust deed, taking account of any letter of wishes. There may also be a protector, who may have power to veto the trustees’ proposals or remove them, and/or a custodian trustee, who holds the assets to the order of the managing trustees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique identifier</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation VII, a unique identifier refers to any unique combination of letters, numbers or symbols that refers to a specific originator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vienna Convention</td>
<td>The 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire transfer</td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendations VII, the terms wire transfer refers to any transaction carried out on behalf of an originator person (both natural and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>legal)</td>
<td>through a financial institution by electronic means with a view to making an amount of money available to a beneficiary person at another financial institution. The originator and the beneficiary may be the same person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Without delay</strong></td>
<td>For the purposes of Special Recommendation III, the phrase <em>without delay</em> has the following specific meaning. For the purposes of S/RES/1267(1999), it means, ideally, within a matter of hours of a designation by the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee. For the purposes of S/RES/1373(2001), the phrase <em>without delay</em> means upon having reasonable grounds, or a reasonable basis, to suspect or believe that a person or entity is a terrorist, one who finances terrorism or a terrorist organisation. The phrase <em>without delay</em> should be interpreted in the context of the need to prevent the flight or dissipation of terrorist-linked funds or other assets, and the need for global, concerted action to interdict and disrupt their flow swiftly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annex 2

Endorsement of the AML/CFT Methodology 2004

This Methodology was agreed by the FATF Plenary at its meeting in February 2004, and approved by the Executive Boards of the IMF and the World Bank in March 2004. The following bodies have also endorsed the Methodology: the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Council of Europe Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (MONEYVAL), the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), the Eurasian Group (EAG), the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF) and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS).
Annex 3

Information on updates made to the 2004 Methodology

The tables below identify the amendments made to the Methodology since its adoption in February 2004. Editorial amendments (as opposed to substantive amendments) are intended to ensure that the Methodology accurately reflects the Recommendations and have no impact on the substance of the requirements. Technical amendments refer to amendments made to reflect the changes made to the standards themselves (including amendments made to Interpretative Notes), to correct some minor mistakes when transposing the Recommendations or to avoid a duplication of assessment of individual Recommendations in the evaluation process.

1. Editorial amendments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Section of the Methodology subject to amendments</th>
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</table>
| February 2005 | ▪ Introduction  
 ▪ R.5 – C.5.15 |

2. Technical amendments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of amendments</th>
<th>Sections subject to amendments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
 ▪ SRIX – a complete set of criteria is introduced  
 ▪ Glossary: adoption of new definitions for (1) bearer negotiable instrument; (2) false declaration; (3) false disclosure; (4) physical cross-border transportation and (5) related to terrorist financing or money laundering |
| October 2005 | Amendment to the treatment of sanctions for DNFBPs to avoid multiple-counting of the same issue | ▪ C.12.3 deleted  
 ▪ C.16.4 deleted  
 ▪ 17.2 reference to "the self-regulatory organisations referred to in Recommendation 24" deleted  
 ▪ 24.2.1 a) reference to "criteria 17.1-17.4 that apply to the obligations under R.12 and R.16" added  
 ▪ note to assessors deleted  
 ▪ Chapeau to essential criteria amended – reference to withdrawals from a bank account through an ATM machine, cash advances from a credit card, or payments for goods and services added.  
 ▪ C.VII.1& C.VII.2: EUR/USD 1 000 or more threshold introduced  
 ▪ C.VII.2: provisions in relation to batch transfers amended – previous provisions deleted  
 ▪ C.VII.3: reference to transactions using a credit or debit card deleted  
 ▪ C.VII.4 – previous provisions on routine batch transfers deleted – new criterion introduced provision related to the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| June 2006  | Introduction – additional elements on corruption                                    | Paragraph 7c) – elements on anti-corruption initiatives added  
Align the Methodology with changes made to the Interpretative Note on SR VII  
Align the Methodology with the new Interpretative Note on SRVIII  
Glossary – adoption of definition of unique identifier  
- Chapeau: reference to Criterion 5.2 deleted  
- C. VII.1 – the verification element amended  
- Footnote of C. VII.1 amended  
- A complete set of essential and additional criteria adopted. C.VIII.1 to C.VIII.4 of Methodology (version February 2004) deleted.  
- Glossary: adoption of new definitions for (1) appropriate authorities; (2) associate NPOs; (3) beneficiary; (4) non-profit organisation. |
| February 2007 | Introduction – additional elements on effectiveness                                 | Paragraph 6 – elements on global effectiveness added  
Insert notes for assessors on interpretation of the FATF Recommendations  
Insertion of Annex 3  
Rec. 1, Rec. 2, SRII, Rec. 12, Rec. 36, 38, 39 & SRV and SRVI  
Information on updates made to the 2004 Methodology added |